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       n the morning of September 27, 2020, heavy fighting erupted along the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact established in the aftermath of the 
1988–1994 war over the region,1 also referred to as the First Nagorno-
Karabakh War. This latest episode of violence in the South Caucasus once 
again pitted the troops of Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey on this occasion,2 
against the forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh and Armenia.  
After two months of military confrontations, which included the deploy-
ment of drones and heavy artillery,3 resulting in substantial military and ci-
vilian casualties on both sides,4 the hostilities came to an end with the signing 
of a tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Russian Fed-
eration on the 9th of November 2020.5 Notably, the agreement substantially 
modifies the existing territorial status quo resulting from the 1994 Bishkek 
Protocol ceasefire.6  
In spite of the conflict’s intensity and inter-State dimension, very few 
States commented on the compatibility of the protagonists’ conduct with the 
international law on the use of force (the jus ad bellum). This silence may partly 
be due to the difficulty in ascertaining the facts on the ground—with both 
 
1. Armenia and Azerbaijan Fight over Disputed Nagorno-Karabakh, BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54314341. 
2. Alexander Gabuev, Viewpoint: Russia and Turkey – Unlikely Victors of Karabakh Con-
flict, BBC NEWS, (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
54903869. 
3. Robyn Dixon, Azerbaijan’s Drones Owned the Battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh—and 
Showed Future of Warfare, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/europe/nagorno-karabkah-drones-azerbaijan-aremenia/2020/11 
/11/441bcbd2-193d-11eb-8bda-814ca56e138b_story.html. 
4. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Killed 5,000 Soldiers, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55174211 (Early reports indicate that around 
5,000 soldiers and over 140 civilians lost their life during the 2020 confrontations). 
5. Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the U.N., Letter dated Nov. 10, 2020 
from the Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2020/1104 (Nov. 11, 2020), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2020_1104_E.pdf [hereinafter 
Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Armenia, and President of the Russian Federation]. 
6. See Bishkek Protocol (May 5, 1994), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-
maker.un.org/files/Bishkek%20Protocol.pdf; see also Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement (May 













Armenia and Azerbaijan accusing each other of triggering hostilities.7 Still, 
the events raise a fundamental question of the jus ad bellum—and one that is 
surprisingly overlooked in legal doctrine. 
 The question is this: when part of a State’s territory is occupied by 
another State for a prolonged duration, can the former still invoke the right 
of self-defense to justify military operations aimed at recovering its land? Put 
differently: can unlawful occupation be regarded as a “continuing” armed 
attack permitting recourse to self-defense at any point in time—even years 
after the occupation commenced? 
The relevance of the question is clear: ever since the 1994 ceasefire 
agreement, the position widely held by the international community has been 
that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is occupied by Armenia, as confirmed, 
for example, by the UN General Assembly and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights.8 Assuming that the region belongs to Azerbaijan and was (and 
partly remains) unlawfully occupied by Armenia, could Azerbaijan effectively 
claim self-defense to lawfully recover it, even though the pre-2020 territorial 
status quo in the region had existed for more than a quarter of a century? 
And can it again invoke self-defense in the near or distant future to recover 
those parts of the region that remain under Armenian control now that the 
guns have fallen silent once more? 
Clearly, the stakes extend far beyond the Caucasus. The answer to the 
above question is indeed of potential relevance for a wide range of conflicts 
around the globe. The purpose of the present article is not to pass judgment 
on Armenia and Azerbaijan’s conduct in their latest confrontation but rather 
to offer a broader appraisal of how the international legal framework gov-
erning the use of force applies to situations of prolonged occupation. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section II we provide a summary of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In Section III we preliminarily examine—
and discard—the suggestion that efforts to recover territory subject to pro-
longed occupation through armed force are somehow excluded from the 
scope of the jus ad bellum because they are governed exclusively by IHL or 
 
7. Permanent Rep. of Azerbaijan to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 27, 2020 from the 
Permanent Rep. of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral, U.N. Doc. S/2020/948 (Sept. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Azerbaijan U.N. Letter dated Sept. 
27, 2020]; Permanent Rep. of Armenia to the United Nations, Letter dated Sept. 28, 2020 
from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the 
U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2020/955 (Sept. 29, 2020).  
8. G.A. Res. 62/243 (Apr. 25, 2008); Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, 











because of their supposedly “intra-State” nature. In Section IV we delve into 
the legal arguments for and against the idea that an occupied State is permit-
ted to use force to recover long-lost land. Specifically, we look at the impact 
of the immediacy requirement (as a condition for the lawful exercise of self-
defense) and the idea that occupation might be construed as a “continuing” 
armed attack. In addition, we consider the interaction with the principle of 
the non-use of force to settle territorial disputes and the role of armistice and 
ceasefire agreements. Section V turns to examples from State practice, in-
cluding, most notably, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, to see how the legal 
framework sketched in previous Sections has been applied in practice. Lastly, 
Section VI draws attention to the clash between competing values—the pro-
tection of territorial integrity versus the quest for international peace and 
security—that underlies the legal conundrum before us. Ultimately, we argue 
that the latest confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not lend 
support to the concept of unlawful occupation as a “continuing armed at-
tack.” 
Before diving into the substantive legal analysis, however, a short intro-
duction to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is in order. 
 
II. THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT IN A NUTSHELL 
 
The latest confrontation over the Nagorno-Karabakh region is yet another 
harrowing episode of a long-standing territorial dispute between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan,9 a conflict often referred to as frozen,10 albeit one prone to 
rekindle periodically and one riddled with complex ethnic and political ram-
ifications. 
The conflict can be traced back to the dawn of the Soviet Union, when 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region, despite being inhabited by a large majority of 
ethnic Armenians, was designated in 1921 as the Nagorno-Karabakh Auton-
 
9. See TIM POTIER, CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH, ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OS-
SETIA. A LEGAL APPRAISAL (2000); HEIKO KRÜGER, THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CON-
FLICT, A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2010). 
10. Thomas D. Grant, Frozen Conflicts and International Law, 50 CORNELL JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 361, 377 (2017); Milena Sterio, The “Frozen” Conflict in Nagorno-












omous Oblast (NKAO) within the territory of the newly formed Soviet So-
cialist Republic of Azerbaijan.11 While the region remained relatively calm 
under Soviet rule, tensions fueled by the discontent of the Karabakh Arme-
nians living in NKAO began to escalate. They reached a boiling point when 
the USSR started to collapse, and its constituent States were gaining inde-
pendence. After unsuccessfully attempting to secede from Azerbaijan and 
join Armenia to no avail in 1988,12 the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” 
(NKR), later renamed the “Republic of Artsakh,” declared its independence 
from Azerbaijan on January 6, 1992, after holding a referendum in which 
99.9 percent of the participants voted in favor of secession. (The Azeri mi-
nority living in the region boycotted the referendum.13)  
After more than six years of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh and its ad-
jacent regions, leaving an estimated 30,000 fatalities and more than one mil-
lion refugees and internally displaced persons,14 hostilities came to an end in 
May 1994 after the mediation of Russia,15 under the auspices of the Organi-
zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group,16 
with the signing of a ceasefire agreement between representatives of Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, and the NKR.17  
The outcome of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War significantly reshaped 
the balance of powers in the region. From an international law standpoint, 
when Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Nagorno-Karabakh remained an integral part of its sovereign territory, in 
accordance with the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis juris.18 
 
11. Heiko Krüger, Nagorno-Karabakh, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 214, 215 (Christian Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg & Kavus 
Abushov eds., 2014). 
12. See Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 14. 
13. Id. ¶ 17. 
14. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AZERBAIJAN: SEVEN YEARS OF CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-
KARABAKH 98–99 (1994). (“Most of the 750,000-800,000 Azeri were displaced or made 
refugees as a result of violations of the rules of war by the Karabakh Armenians.”). 
15. See Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 24. 
16. The OSCE Minsk Group has sustained long-standing international mediation at-
tempts since its inception in 1992. See Minsk Group, OSCE, https://www.osce.org/minsk-
group/108306 (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). 
17. Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement, supra note 6. 
18. Anne Peters, The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris: How Relevant Is It for Issues of Secession?, 
in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 95, 
110 (“The better view is that today uti possidetis has the value of a customary rule which 
applies to secession beyond the colonial context.”); Andriy Y. Melnyk, Nagorny-Karabakh, 











Yet, despite its unambiguous legal status, in the aftermath of the war, Arme-
nia had been widely regarded by the international community as the occupy-
ing power in Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven Azeri adjacent regions, a sta-
tus quo that stood unaltered until the armed conflict that broke out in Sep-
tember 2020.  
As early as 1993, the Security Council issued four resolutions condemn-
ing the escalation of the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh and requesting the 
withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.19 While the 
resolutions did not refer explicitly to Armenia as an occupying force, it was 
heavily implied in their wording and context. Furthermore, the General As-
sembly passed a resolution in 2008 reaffirming Armenia’s occupation of Na-
gorno-Karabakh and demanding the immediate withdrawal of its troops 
from the region.20 Other international organizations voiced the same ap-
praisal of the situation, including, for instance, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe in 200521 and the European Parliament in 2010.22 
In practical terms, while the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh has 
carried out the day-to-day administration of Nagorno-Karabakh since 1994, 
Armenia continued to exercise effective control over the region until the 
outbreak of the 2020 conflict.23 Since its declaration of independence in 
1992, the NKR has not gained recognition from any State or international 
organization, including Armenia. Moreover, from its very inception, the sub-




19. S.C. Res. 822 (Apr. 30, 1993); S.C. Res. 853 (July 29, 1993); S.C. Res. 874 (Oct. 14, 
1993); S.C. Res. 884 (Nov. 14, 1993). 
20. G.A. Res. 62/243 (Apr. 25, 2008). It is worth noting, however, that the resolution 
was passed with a recorded vote of thirty-nine in favor, seven against, and one hundred 
abstentions. 
21. Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Resolution 1416, The Conflict Over 
the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference (Jan. 25, 2005), 
https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17289&lang= 
en. 
22. European Parliament, Resolution of 20 May 2010 on the Need for an EU Strategy 
for the South Caucasus, O.J. (C 161 E/20), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/docu-
ment/TA-7-2010-0193_EN.html. 
23. See Military Occupation of Azerbaijan by Armenia, RULAC, https://www.rulac. 
org/browse/conflicts/military-occupation-of-azerbaijan-by-armenia#collapse3accord (last 











and economic support.24 Armenian and NKR military forces have been de-
scribed as “highly integrated,” with Armenia’s involvement being considered 
as the decisive factor behind the success of the continuous occupation of the 
region.25 In its assessment of the situation on the ground in the Chiragov case, 
the European Court of Human Rights found that “the NKR and its admin-
istration survive by virtue of the military, political, financial and other sup-
port given to it by Armenia which, consequently, exercises effective control 
over Nagorno-Karabakh.”26 In light of the foregoing, authors have described 
the Republic of Artsakh as a “puppet regime” or a de facto Armenian prov-
ince.27  
The 2020 conflict and its outcome further underscored the inter-State 
character of the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial dispute. Notably, the agree-
ment that put an end to hostilities on November 10, 2020, was signed exclu-
sively between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, without the NKR’s partici-
pation, providing further proof of the latter’s lack of sufficient autonomy to 
be considered an independent actor in the current conflict.28  
Within this framework of reference, a territorial status quo settled in the 
region over the last quarter of a century. Admittedly, violence resurged spo-
radically after more than a decade of relative calm, including a four-day war 
in 2016,29 yet, for over twenty-five years, the prevailing state of affairs was 
one of stability. Hence, no substantial changes to territorial control over the 
region took place before the 2020 hostilities. By contrast, the recent military 
confrontations have significantly altered the existing status quo in the South 
Caucasus. Azerbaijan regained control over all seven districts surrounding 
 
24. Krüger, supra note 9, at 228, Melnyk, supra note 18.  
25. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, ¶ 180 (2015); INTERNATIONAL 
CRISIS GROUP, NAGORNO-KARABAKH: VIEWING THE CONFLICT FROM THE GROUND 10 
(2005). 
26. Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 186. 
27. See Melnyk, supra note 18. 
28. Dapo Akande & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Use of Force in Self-Defence to Recover Occu-
pied Territory: When Is It Permissible?, EJIL:TALK! (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
use-of-force-in-self-defence-to-recover-occupied-territory-when-is-it-permissible/; Bern-
hard Knoll-Tudor & Daniel Mueller, At Daggers Drawn: International Legal Issues Surrounding 
the Conflict In and Around Nagorno-Karabakh, EJIL:TALK! (Nov. 17, 2020), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/at-daggers-drawn-international-legal-issues-surrounding-the-con-
flict-in-and-around-nagorno-karabakh/; Júlia Miklasová, The Recent Ceasefire in Nagorno-
Karabakh: Territorial Control, Peacekeepers and Question of Status, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 4, 2020), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-recent-ceasefire-in-nagorno-karabakh-territorial-control-
peacekeepers-and-unanswered-question-of-status/.  











Nagorno-Karabakh and reclaimed the city of Shusha, an important enclave 
inside the latter, only ten kilometers away from its capital Stepanakert. As a 
consequence, the newly established line of contact—to be monitored by 
Russian peacekeepers—runs straight through Nagorno-Karabakh, which, 
besides the Lachin corridor guaranteed in the ceasefire, was cut-off from the 
rest of the territory of Armenia.30  
In light of the foregoing, the question that arises is whether Azerbaijan 
could legally justify the recovery of occupied land as an exercise of self-de-
fense—and whether it might again use force in an exercise of self-defense in 
future years to recover those parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh region that 
remain under Armenian control in the wake of the 2020 hostilities. 
A question that must be tackled first, however, is whether the jus ad bellum 
is even applicable in this context. 
 
III. MILITARY ACTION TO RECOVER OCCUPIED TERRITORY—                               
A MATTER GOVERNED BY THE LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE? 
 
A. A Question of the Jus in Bello Only? 
 
In contemporary international law, the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, also re-
ferred to as international humanitarian law (IHL), are two independent and 
self-contained branches of international law,31 both dealing with the phe-
nomenon of armed force from a different perspective. Whereas the former 
regime focuses on determining the legality of the use of force between States, 
restricting its recurrence to a bare minimum by establishing limited excep-
tions and conditions under which military action may be justified, the latter 
operates when the use of force has already materialized and reached the 
threshold of an armed conflict, regulating aspects of the hostilities, such as 
the weapons employed and the protection of persons hors de combat.  
 
30. See Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Armenia, and President of the Russian Federation, supra note 5. Additionally, 
the parties agreed to exchange prisoners of war, hostages, and bodies of the deceased, while 
Russia committed to deploy peacekeeping forces along the contact line for a renewable pe-
riod of five years, and internally displaced persons and refugees are to return to the territory 
of Nagorno-Karabakh and its adjacent districts under the oversight of the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees. 
31. Federica D’Alessandra & Robert Heinsch, Rethinking the Relationship Between Jus in 
Bello and Jus ad Bellum: A Dialogue Between Authors, in SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE 











The relationship between these two legal regimes remains the subject of 
much academic attention. In classical international law, their separation was 
characterized as a dichotomy between the norms operating in times of peace 
and those applicable in times of war.32 Put differently, both sets of rules were 
understood to operate at different stages to the exclusion of the other,33 be-
fore and after force had been carried out. Thus, the traditional conception 
of the relationship between the regimes suggested that once the jus in bello 
entered the fray as the applicable normative framework, the jus ad bellum was 
no longer relevant for the conflict and ceased to operate.34  
Following the preceding approach, some authors maintain that as soon 
as a large-scale international armed conflict erupts between two States, and 
until the time when that conflict is conclusively brought to an end (in partic-
ular through a formal peace agreement), military confrontations between the 
two States are governed exclusively by IHL, thus rendering moot the appli-
cation inter se of the jus ad bellum.35 This would also apply to a situation of 
belligerent occupation, as this inevitably entails the continuation of an inter-
national armed conflict between the States concerned (as per Common Ar-
ticle 2 of the Geneva Conventions36). 
In stark contrast to that position, however, it is submitted here that mil-
itary action to recover occupied territory will always need to be justified un-
der the jus ad bellum to be deemed lawful. As Christopher Greenwood ex-
plains, the above interpretation made sense in times when a sharp divide 
existed between the rules applicable in times of peace and in times of war,37 
since the use of force was not yet proscribed as a means to settle disputes 
between States and once war was declared it altered almost every aspect of 
the relationship between the parties involved. The position asserting that 
 
32. Marko Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 256, 258 (Nigel 
White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013). 
33. Cristopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, 9 
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 221, 221 (1983). 
34. MARCO LONGOBARDO, THE USE OF ARMED FORCE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY 118 
(2018). 
35. The main proponent of this approach is arguably Yoram Dinstein. See YORAM DIN-
STEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 61–64 (6th ed. 2017). But see also: LON-
GOBARDO, supra note 34, at 130; Michael N. Schmitt, Iraq (2003 Onwards), in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 356, 364–65 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
ed., 2012). 
36. See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.    











only the initial recourse to force leading to occupation falls under the realm 
of the jus ad bellum, leaving the rest of the hostilities in the exclusive hands of 
the jus in bello, is a minority position that is outdated in modern international 
law. Today it is generally accepted in legal doctrine that the jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello are complementary regimes38 and, depending on the type of armed 
conflict, apply simultaneously39 instead of in sequence.40 This position also 
finds support in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion.41 Accordingly, while the legality of the initial use of force 
is dealt with exclusively by the jus ad bellum, once hostilities have commenced, 
they will be subject cumulatively42 to the provisions of both legal frame-
works.43  
An important implication arising from the foregoing reasoning is that 
States involved in hostilities need to circumscribe their military activities, 
throughout the entire conflict, to necessary and proportionate measures adopted 
in the context of self-defense. At the same time, they must observe the ex-
isting rules on methods and means of warfare and the law of occupation,44 
 
38. KEIICHIRO OKIMOTO, THE DISTINCTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUS AD 
BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO 31 (2011). 
39. Jasmine Moussa, Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the two 
bodies of law, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 963, 968 (2008); Greenwood, 
supra note 33, at 221. 
40. See Greenwood, supra note 33, at 224. (“There is nothing in those provisions to 
suggest that they cease to apply once a state of war has come into existence. To hold other-
wise would be to allow a state to avoid the application of some of the most fundamental 
rules contained in the Charter by the unilateral act of characterizing its relations with another 
state as war. It is true that a declaration of war may mean that the range of measures which 
may be employed in self-defence becomes more extensive but this is no longer an automatic 
consequence flowing from the initiation of a state of war.”). 
41. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶ 42 (July 8) (“[a] use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, 
must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed con-
flict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”). 
42. Terry Gill, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
and the Fundamental Distinction Between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 12 LEIDEN JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 613, 614–16 (1999); Keiichiro Okimoto, The Cumulative Re-
quirements of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Context of Self-Defense, 11 CHINESE JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45, 58 (2012). 
43. Vaios Koutroulis, Of Occupation, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: A Reply to Solon 
Solomon’s “The Great Oxymoron: Jus In Bello Violations as Legitimate Non-Forcible Measures of Self-
Defense: The Post-Disengagement Israeli Measures Towards Gaza as a Case Study,” 10 CHINESE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 897, 912 (2011); Greenwood, supra note 33, at 222.  











essential components of IHL. Hence, armed force initially justified under the 
jus ad bellum may become unlawful during the course of the hostilities if it 
stops being proportionate, necessary, and defensive in nature, even if the 
military actions comply with all the rules engrained in IHL.45 Conversely, a 
State entitled to use force under the jus ad bellum may also breach international 
law, for instance, if it employs means and methods of warfare forbidden un-
der the jus in bello.46 A further direct consequence of the cumulative, yet in-
dependent,47 application of both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello to an armed 
conflict is that the legality of an act under one regime does not render it as 
lawful in the other. 48  
In the specific context of belligerent occupation, the dual application of 
the jus ad bellum and IHL is particularly present throughout its entire dura-
tion.49 While the legality of the conduct leading to occupation is determined 
solely by the jus ad bellum, once the facts on the ground reveal that part of the 
territory of a State is being occupied by the forces of a foreign power, the 
law of occupation is fully applicable, independently of the legal qualification 
of the acts which led to it.50  
At the same time, while a situation of occupation will generally arise as a 
consequence of an international armed conflict between two States, it is not 
uncommon to encounter occupations that endure for extended periods of 
time, during which no active hostilities take place between the parties for 
years and even decades of relative calm and peaceful administration of the 
occupied territory.51 In these cases of prolonged occupation, which are the 
type of situations which inform the current study, it has been suggested that 
 
45. Moussa, supra note 39, at 968; Greenwood, supra note 33, at 223. See also Eliav 
Lieblich, On the Continuous and Concurrent Application of ad Bellum and in Bello, in NECESSITY 
AND PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY LAW 41 (Claus Kress 
& Robert Lawless eds., 2020). 
46. Christopher Greenwood, The Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons and the Contribution 
of the International Court to International Humanitarian Law, 37 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
THE RED CROSS 65, 74. 
47. Koutroulis, supra note 43, at 913; Okimoto, supra note 42, at 74. 
48. D’Alessandra & Heinsch, supra note 31, at 472; Koutroulis, supra note 43, at 910; 
Moussa, supra note 39, at 968; Okimoto, supra note 42, at 50. 
49. Rotem Giladi, The Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello Distinction and the Law of Occupation, 41 
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 246, 249 (2012). 
50. See Eyal Benvenisti, Occupation, Belligerent, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (updated May 2009), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e359.  
51. Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force During Occupation: Law Enforcement and Conduct of Hostil-











occupation outlives the international armed conflict that originated it in the 
first place.52 As Marko Milanovic points out,  
 
[t]he original armed conflict can be distinguished from any subsequent new 
armed conflicts occurring in an occupied territory. The two Palestinian in-
tifadas are not legally a part of the international armed conflict in which the 
Palestinian territories were occupied, namely the 1967 Six Day War, which 
is now long over.53 
 
Against this, Marco Longobardo argues that “[e]ven if actual hostilities have 
diminished down, the situation of occupation inherently preserves the exist-
ence of an armed conflict in the occupied territory.”54 Alternatively, other 
authors have claimed that because belligerent occupation is necessarily the 
result of an armed conflict, both situations are mutually exclusive, and once 
hostilities restart, occupation comes to an end.55  
Whether occasional flare-ups of inter-State hostilities against the back-
ground of an ongoing situation of belligerent occupation are part of a single 
overarching armed conflict, or whether these constitute separate interna-
tional armed conflicts of their own, is to some extent an exercise in seman-
tics, and is, in any case, a debate that exceeds the scope of the current anal-
ysis. The crucial point for present purposes is that the mere existence of an 
ongoing situation of (prolonged) belligerent occupation does not eclipse the 
need for a proper legal basis under the jus ad bellum when one of the States 
launches a (new) attack against the other. 
Importantly, the preceding is borne out in actual State practice. Thus, 
when in 1973, Syria, Egypt, and Israel crossed swords in the Yom Kippur 
War, this was undeniably regarded as a matter governed by the jus ad bellum, 
notwithstanding the ongoing Israeli occupation of Arab land in the wake of 
the Six-Day War.56 In more recent years too, when clashes have taken place 
between Israel and Syria, the States concerned have repeatedly framed their 
actions by reference to the UN Charter rules governing the use of force, 
 
52. Milanovic & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 32, at 301. 
53. Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror: 
Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings Case, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
THE RED CROSS 373, 384 (2007). 
54. LONGOBARDO, supra note 34, at 126. 
55. Adam Roberts, Occupation, Military, Termination of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (updated June 2009), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/ 
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1927. 











instead of simply hiding behind the existence of an international armed con-
flict flowing from the occupation of the Golan Heights.57 The same is true 
for the military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020: 
both countries invoked the right of self-defense, respectively blaming the 
other for initiating the hostilities.58 
As things stand, a State whose territory has been occupied without its 
consent may use force to recover it as long as its actions can be justified 
under the jus ad bellum, that is, if the military operation qualifies as a measure 
of self-defense both necessary and proportionate to the armed attack to 
which it is responding. Additionally, the simultaneous application of the rules 
concerning the conduct of hostilities will depend on whether there is an ac-
tive international armed conflict at the time military action is undertaken with 
the purpose of recovering territory. In any case, the rules pertaining to the 
law of occupation will remain in force until its termination. Accordingly, the 
view that each of the parties involved in an occupation may resume hostilities 
at any point in time without the need for a justification under the jus ad bellum 
appears to be a minority position that finds no support in State practice. The 
specific aspects concerning the application and temporal scope of the right 
of self-defense in the context of occupation will be assessed in the subse-
quent Sections. 
 
B. Military Action to Recover Occupied Territory as a Purely “Intra-State” Phe-
nomenon? 
 
The jus ad bellum legal framework enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as in 
customary international law, has a manifest inter-State scope,59 as has been 
 
57. See, e.g., Permanent Rep. of Israel to the U.N., Letter dated May 23, 2013 from the 
Permanent Rep. of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General 
and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2013/314 (May 23, 2013); Perma-
nent Rep. of Israel to the U.N., Letter dated July 16, 2013 from the Permanent Rep. of Israel 
to the United Nations addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2013/425 (July 17, 2013). 
58. Permanent Rep. of Armenia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 28, 2020 from the Per-
manent Rep. of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General, 
U.N. Doc. S/2020/955 (Sept. 29, 2020); Permanent Rep. of Azerbaijan to the U.N., Letter 
dated Sept. 29, 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Na-
tions addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2020/956 (Sept. 30, 2020). 











consistently upheld by the ICJ.60 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter61 prohibits 
explicitly the threat or use of force solely between States and, more specifi-
cally, in the exercise of their international relations. Similarly, Article 51 rec-
ognizes the right of self-defense in response to an armed attack against a 
member of the United Nations,62 thus confirming that States are the sole 
subjects of international law and, as such, are bound and protected by the 
prohibition of the use of force and, consequently, entitled to the right of self-
defense as a temporary measure of self-help. It follows that only conduct 
amounting to armed force perpetrated by a State against another State will 
trigger the provisions laid down under the jus ad bellum. 
Conversely, the use of force carried out by a State within its territory in 
the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction does not fall under the scope of the 
prohibition of the use of force.63 In other words, military operations of a 
purely internal character, such as hostilities arising in the context of a civil 
war between government troops and insurgents or secessionist movements 
operating from within its sovereign territory, are considered to be domestic 
matters and do not need to be justified under the jus ad bellum regulatory 
framework.64  
In light of the foregoing, could it be argued that an Azeri attempt to 
recover (parts of) the Nagorno-Karabakh region does not qualify as a use of 
force since the operation is limited to its own territory? A number of obser-
vations are in order. 
 
60. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶ 146–47 (Dec. 19); 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9). 
61. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
62. Id. art. 51. 
63. Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver Dörr, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200, 214 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2012). 
64. OLIVIER CORTEN, LE DROIT CONTRE LA GUERRE [THE LAW AGAINST WAR] 227 
(2020); Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (updated Aug. 2019), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e427; DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND 
SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 89–90; Some authors have nonetheless argued (de lege 
ferenda) in favor of an “internal jus ad bellum.” See, e.g., Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus ad Bellum, 
67 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 687 (2016). But see Tom Ruys, The Quest for an Internal Jus ad 
Bellum: International Law’s Missing Link, Mere Distraction or Pandora’s Box?, in NECESSITY AND 











First, several authors take the view that the prohibition on the use of 
force is not limited to inter-State relations sensu stricto but also extends to the 
relationship between a State and a breakaway region that has established it-
self as a so-called “de facto regime.”65 Some adopt a restrictive approach, ac-
cepting that the jus ad bellum is not applicable in relations between a State and 
a non-State entity,66 unless the non-State political entity manages to establish 
itself as a stabilized de facto regime,67 with autonomous, effective control 
over territory for a sustained period of time, or the entity can be assimilated 
to a State.68 The General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression69 is often 
cited to substantiate this claim.70 Article I of the cited resolution indeed con-
tains an explanatory note asserting that the term State should be “used with-
out prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member 
of the United Nations.”71 
Support for the foregoing position can also be found in the 2009 report 
of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia (IIFFMCG). The IIFFMCG affirmed that the prohibition of the 
use of force was fully binding upon all the parties involved in the conflict, 72 
including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were characterized in the re-
port as an “entity short of statehood” and a “state-like entity,” respectively.73 
According to the IIFFMCG, the existence of agreements of different legal 
 
65. JOCHEN FROWEIN, DAS DE FACTO-REGIME IM VÖLKERRECHT: EINE UNTER-
SUCHUNG ZUR RECHTSTELLUNG NICHTANERKANNTER STAATEN UND ÄHNLICHER GE-
BILDE [THE DE FACTO REGIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INVESTIGATION ON THE 
LEGAL LAW IN UNRECOGNIZED STATES AND SIMILAR SITUATIONS] 52–66 (1968); Jochen 
A. Frowein, De Facto Regime, ¶¶ 4–5, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (updated Mar. 2013), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780 
199231690/law-9780199231690-e1395. See also Stefan Oeter, De facto Regimes in International 
Law, in UNRECOGNISED SUBJECTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59, 70–71 (Wladysaw Czaplin-
ski & Agata Kleczkowska eds., 2019). 
66. CORTEN, supra note 64, 264. 
67. Randelzhofer & Dörr, supra note 63, at 213 (“It is almost generally accepted that de 
facto regimes exercising their authority in a stabilized manner are also bound and protected 
by Art. 2(4).”); see also FROWEIN, De Facto Regime, supra note 65.  
68. CORTEN, supra note 64, at 263. 
69. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression (Dec. 14, 1974). 
70. See FROWEIN, De Facto Regime, supra note 65; Christian Henderson & James A. 
Green, The Jus Ad Bellum and Entities Short of Statehood in the Report on the Conflict in Georgia, 
59 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 129, 134 (2010). 
71. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 69, art. 1. 
72. 2 REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON 
THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA 238–42 (2009).  











nature between the parties, expressing their commitment to certain princi-
ples and purposes recognized in the UN Charter, in particular, the peaceful 
settlement of disputes and a call to not use force between them, rendered 
Articles 2(4) and 51 as binding upon all the parties involved in the conflict, 
irrespective of their legal status.  
On the other hand, the reasoning of the IIFFMCG remains controver-
sial. The drafters were criticized for swiftly concluding that the signing of 
certain agreements between the parties equated to the full applicability of 
Articles 2(4) and 51 to the non-State actors involved in the conflict, even 
though none of the parties involved invoked either of those provisions to 
justify their actions during or after the hostilities.74 Naturally, States are able 
to commit to not use force against non-State political entities, yet, it does not 
follow from this that the latter become bound and protected by the core 
provisions of the jus ad bellum regime, or that Articles 2(4) and 51 must be 
understood as incorporated into an agreement that includes actors other 
than States as signatories.75 Further, some have objected that there is no ev-
idence to affirm that the interpretation advanced by the IIFFMCG has re-
ceived widespread acceptance by the international community of States,76 
suggesting that the report’s conclusions on this subject must be considered 
at most as lex ferenda.77 As to Article I of the Definition of Aggression, and 
notwithstanding the General Assembly’s 1974 resolution’s importance, it 
may be observed that the resolution did not extend the applicability of Arti-
cles 2(4) and 51 to non-State entities, as that could only be accomplished 
through a modification of the text of the UN Charter or a change in custom-
ary international law.78 
In the end, for present purposes, it is not necessary to take a firm stance 
on the application of the prohibition on the use of force vis-à-vis de facto 
regimes—even if the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” could potentially be 
so qualified.79 The reason is that the mere fact that a State uses armed force 
 
74. CORTEN, supra note 64, at 262. 
75. Henderson & Green, supra note 70, at 133. 
76. CORTEN, supra note 64, at 263. 
77. Henderson & Green, supra note 70, at 138. 
78. Dapo Akande, The Diversity of Rules on the Use of Force: Implications for the Evolution of 
the Law, EJIL:TALK! (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-diversity-of-rules-on-
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79. The counterargument against the presentation of the NKR as a stable and de facto 
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financial and other support given to it by Armenia.” See Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. 











within its own territory does not a priori prevent the application of the jus ad 
bellum, inasmuch as the force is (deliberately) directed against another State or 
its external manifestations.80 Thus, when State A invites foreign troops of 
State B onto its soil, and they overstay their welcome after the invitation has 
been retracted, a subsequent attempt by State A to forcibly expel these 
troops is not a question of simple law enforcement, but a matter for the jus 
ad bellum. In a similar vein, when a State uses armed force against a foreign 
warship or military aircraft within its territorial sea or airspace, such conduct 
requires a justification under the Charter framework governing the use of 
force.81 
A fortiori, in the specific context of occupation, whereas it could be ar-
gued that the recovery of occupied territory through military means could 
qualify as an exclusively internal affair, mainly because every State is entitled 
to deploy forces all across its sovereign territory, such a viewpoint ignores 
the unequivocal inter-State component behind occupation and the military 
response to it. Indeed, military occupation is regarded as a textbook example 
of the use of force against the territorial integrity of a State82 and is listed as 
an act of aggression under Article 3(a) of the 1974 UN General Assembly 
Definition of Aggression.83 Occupation has been described as a situation 
where the forces of one or more States exercise effective control over a por-
tion of the territory of another State without the latter’s consent.84 It will 
usually involve the deployment of ground forces by the occupying power in 
 
80. Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Mini-
mal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 159, 171 (2014). 
81. It is telling in this respect that documents such as the U.S. Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of Naval Operations or the Australian Operations Law for RAAF Commanders 
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enshrined in Article 51 U.N. Charter. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST 
GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 4.4.3 (2017); ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR 
FORCE, AA 1003, OPERATIONS LAW OF RAAF COMMANDERS ¶ 2.25 (2004). (See Ruys, supra 
note 80 at 185 (with references). 
82. TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLU-
TIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (2010). 
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the occupied territory.85 Belligerent occupation in the legal sense is neces-
sarily linked to the existence of an inter-State conflict between two or more 
States.86 Thus, military action to recover territory occupied by another State 
falls unequivocally under the prohibition established in Article 2(4). Its legal-
ity will ultimately depend on whether it can be justified as an act of self-
defense or has been authorized by the Security Council. The fact that a State 
only uses force within its own territory to regain control over it does not take 
away the inter-State nature of the force employed, which is defined by the 
involvement of two more sovereign States faced against each other.87  
In light of the foregoing, the assumption that the Nagorno-Karabakh 
region is a part of Azeri territory under Armenian occupation does not imply 
that the prohibition on the use of force was inapplicable to the 2020 war, 
which undeniably involved a recourse to armed force between States (as the 
casualty figures on both sides regrettably illustrate). Nor did Azerbaijan, for 
that matter, dismiss the relevance of the jus ad bellum, instead construing its 
actions as a “counter-offensive . . . within the right of self-defence.”88 
Having established the relevance of the jus ad bellum, we now turn to its 
substantive application in situations of (prolonged) occupation. 
 
IV. MILITARY ACTION TO RECOVER OCCUPIED TERRITORY—APPLY-
ING THE LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE 
 
A. Applying the Right of Self-defense 
 
1. Self-defense and the Principle of Immediacy 
 
Let us take a closer look at the jus ad bellum. As a first point, recall that under 
customary international law any exercise of self-defense is subject to the so-
 
85. Leaving aside the exceptional situation in the Gaza Strip following the Israeli dis-
engagement in 2005. See, e.g., Hanne Cuyckens, Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in Gaza?, 63 
NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 275 (2016). 
86. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 37 
(2d ed. 2019). In other words, the occupation legal regime does not apply in conflicts of an 
internal nature, as “the majority view maintains that the retaking by government armed 
forces of national territory previously held by insurgents is not occupation, nor can insur-
gents occupy part of the national territory within the law of occupation’s meaning.” Philip 
Spoerri, The Law of Occupation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
ARMED CONFLICT 182, 185 (Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014). 
87. Milanovic, supra note 53, at 384. 











called “immediacy” requirement. Immediacy—sometimes regarded as part 
of the broader “necessity” requirement89 and sometimes as a self-standing 
requirement under customary international law90—requires close proximity 
in time between the start of an armed attack and the response in self-defense. 
It is generally accepted in legal doctrine91 and also finds support in State 
practice92 and case-law.93 The immediacy requirement primarily serves to dis-
tinguish between lawful acts of self-defense, on the one hand, and (unlawful) 
punitive reprisals that are not justified by any “necessity” to act in self-de-
fense on the other hand. One interesting issue of contention in this context 
is whether self-defense can be exercised when an armed attack is factually 
over, for instance, when a State conducts a cross-border attack and subse-
quently withdraws from the victim State’s territory.  
This issue arose in the Oil Platforms case.94 While the Court did not di-
rectly tackle the issue, customary practice and legal doctrine effectively indi-
cate that if a State has been subjected, not to an isolated attack, but to a series 
 
89. See James A. Green, The Ratione Temporis Elements of Self-Defence, 2 JOURNAL ON 
THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 108 (2015); RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK,’ 
supra note 82, at 99.  
90. See DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 252. 
91. See, e.g., Green, supra note 89, at 108. (regarding this as “uncontroversial”); CORTEN, 
supra note 64, at 765–67; DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 
35, at 252; RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK,’ supra note 82, at 99.  
92. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR 27th Sess., 1664th mtg. ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1644 (Feb. 27-
28, 1972); U.N. GAOR 19th Sess., 1107th mtg. ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1107 (Apr. 3, 1964); 
Green, supra note 89, at 109. 
93. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 237 (June 27). 
94. Iran argued against the permissibility of post facto self-defense, thereby expressly 
relying on the immediacy requirement:  
 
[T]he principle of immediacy . . . means that the employment of counter-force must be 
temporally interlocked with the armed attack triggering it. . . . [I]n cases of single armed 
attacks (as distinguished from a general situation of armed conflict), the attack is terminated 
when the incident is over. In such a case the subsequent use of counter-force constitutes a 
reprisal and not an exercise of self-defence.  
 
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Reply and Defence to Counter-claim submitted by Iran, ¶ 7.47 
(Mar. 10, 1999), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/90/8630.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Reply and Defence to Counter-claim]. The United States objected vehemently, arguing 
that Iran’s narrow understanding of the immediacy requirement “would render self-defense 
illusory” in cases, for instance, where “armed attacks . . . lasted only a few seconds.” Oil 
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Counter-Memorial and Counter-claim submitted by the United 












of armed attacks, and if there is considerable likelihood that more attacks 
will imminently follow, then self-defense is not automatically excluded when 
a “pin-prick” attack is factually over.95 
While the immediacy requirement primarily serves to exclude punitive 
reprisals, authors have also stressed its broader importance in preventing in-
ter-State hostilities that are re-opened much later in time without the occur-
rence of a new “armed attack” and without being subjected to a renewed 
application of the proportionality and necessity criteria.96 In the words of 
Oscar Schachter, “[w]ithout that [temporal] limitation, self-defense would 
sanction armed attacks for countless prior acts of aggression and conquest. 
It would completely swallow up the basic rule against use of force.”97 
It is clear that the immediacy requirement does not lend itself to a simple 
quantitative test but must be interpreted in a flexible and pragmatic manner 
that takes into account the circumstances of each case.98 In particular, prac-
tice suggests that the requirement should leave sufficient leeway, for in-
stance, to conduct investigations (who was responsible for the attack?), to 
exhaust peaceful means, or to take military preparations prior to the actual 
exercise of self-defense. The last two factors may be of particular importance 
in situations of large-scale territorial incursions (potentially) resulting in oc-
cupation or annexation. Thus, in 1982 when Argentinian forces invaded the 
contested Falkland/Malvinas Islands, third States implicitly agreed that the 
passage of several weeks before the United Kingdom initiated active military 
operations against Argentina did not of itself deprive it of its right of self-
defense.99 On the other hand, due to the principle of immediacy, the State 
whose territory is invaded in breach of the prohibition on the use of force 
loses the ability to invoke the right of self-defense if either (i) it refrains from 
 
95. RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK,’ supra note 82, at 106; CORTEN, supra note 64, at 767. 
96. CONSTANTINOS YIALLOURIDES ET AL., THE USE OF FORCE IN RELATION TO SOV-
EREIGNTY DISPUTES OVER LAND TERRITORY ¶¶ 152, 157, 161 (2018). 
97. Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 291, 292 (1984). 
98. In this sense, see CORTEN, supra note 64, at 768; DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION 
AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 252, 287–88; RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK,’ supra note 82, 
at 100; Green, supra note 89, at 109–11 (stressing the need for a “reasonable temporal prox-
imity”). 
99. See Etienne Henry, The Falklands/Malvinas War — 1982, in THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 361 (Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten & Alex-
andra Hofer eds., 2018); In a similar vein, see, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE USE OF 
FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (2018); DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-











responding with counter-force for a prolonged period of time (taking into 
account the need for negotiations, military preparations, efforts to seek third-
State support, etc.); or, (ii) it responds with counter-force, but ultimately fails 
to repel the invading forces from its territory before a prolonged cessation 
of active hostilities materializes.100 In both cases, the underlying concept is 
that the right of self-defense ceases to apply when a new territorial status 
quo is established whereby the occupying State peacefully administers the 
territory concerned for a prolonged period—that is, until the occupying State 
commits a new armed attack.101 One might, of course, critique the uncer-
tainty resulting from the fact that no clear time limit can be determined.102 
Schachter states, however,  
 
 
100. YIALLOURIDES ET AL., supra note 96, ¶ 158; Quincy Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 617, 623–24 (1962). (“A state that neglects 
to defend its frontiers against hostile encroachments soon loses its right to do so, and can 
rely only on negotiation or action by the United Nations to restore its rightful possession 
and thus remove a threat to international peace and security.”); Constantinos Yiallourides 
& Zeray Yihdego, Disputed Territories and the Law on the Use of Force: Lessons from the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Case, in ETHIOPIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2018: IN PURSUIT OF 
PEACE AND PROSPERITY 35, 52–57 (Zeray Yihdego, Melaku Geboye Desta & Martha Belete 
Hailu eds., 2018). 
101. YIALLOURIDES ET AL., supra note 96, ¶¶ 158, 163. With regard to the necessity and 
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offensive with a view to recovering the occupied territory. On the concept of on-the-spot-
reaction, see DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 261–63. 
The present authors would not go as far as to suggest that if the occupying State itself con-
ducts a new large-scale armed attack and re-activates a major international armed conflict 
with the occupied State, the proportionality principle would automatically prevent the oc-
cupied State from recovering (part of) the occupied territory as part of the exercise of its 
right of self-defense. For the contrary position, see YIALLOURIDES ET AL., supra note 96, ¶ 
163 (“Provided the requirements of self-defence . . . are satisfied, State A may rely on self-
defence in response to State B’s most recent attack. Accordingly, State A can use force to 
take back the area between point Y and X; State A, however, cannot use force to push State 
B’s forces over the border and, thus, retake the territory it lost in State B’s first attack.”). See 
also infra Section IV(D) on the impact of the law of State responsibility and the concept of 
contributory fault. See also Knoll-Tudor & Mueller, supra note 28 (drawing attention, inter 
alia, to the requirement of immediacy and stressing that “[c]ontinued occupation cannot be 
equated with ‘continued attack’”). 











[t]he difficulty of defining a precise time limit—a statute of limitations, as 
it were—does not impugn the basic idea. In most cases, irredentist de-
mands for lost territory or claims for restoration of the status quo ante are 
based on attacks that occurred many years, even decades, ago. To extend 
self-defense to such cases is to stretch the notion of defense far beyond its 
essential sense of a response to an attack or immediate threat of attack.103 
 
Put differently, while the principle of immediacy can—and arguably 
should—be construed flexibly in cases of occupation, the lapse of time be-
tween the initial attack and the invocation of self-defense cannot be extended 
indefinitely. Otherwise, the ratione temporis dimension of self-defense would 
be rendered meaningless in this context. 
 
2. Occupation as a Continuing Armed Attack? 
 
Admittedly, while some authors apply the immediacy requirement not only 
to pin-prick attacks but also to territorial incursions resulting in occupation, 
others fundamentally disagree. In particular, the main counterargument is 
that unlawful occupation is not subject to this principle because it allegedly 
constitutes a continuing armed attack, thus permitting the State concerned to 
exercise the right of self-defense for as long as the occupation continues—
even if this entails challenging a years-long territorial status quo.104 This ar-
gument has occasionally been put forward in legal doctrine,105 including in 
connection with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.106 As we will see in 
Section V below, it has also been invoked in State practice. By way of illus-
tration, when it sought to argue in the Oil Platforms case that post-facto self-
defense is excluded pursuant to the principle of immediacy, Iran juxtaposed 
situations of occupation to other forms of attack, asserting that “[i]n the case 
 
103. Schachter, supra note 97, at 292. 
104. CORTEN, supra note 64, at 766–67. 
105. LONGOBARDO, supra note 34, at 121; Henry, supra note 99, at 375. More ambigu-
ous, see, e.g., Green, supra note 89, at 110 (suggesting that the acceptance of the British 
response twenty-three days after Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands “may have simply 
been due to the fact that . . . there was a continued occupation of the islands, which, on one 
assessment, could be perceived as an ongoing armed attack”). 
106. See Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 28; Olivier Corten, Vaios Koutroulis & 
François Dubuisson, Le Conflit au Haut-Karabakh et le Droit International [The Nagorno-Karabakh 
Conflict and International Law] YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch? 












of the invasion of another State’s territory, in principle an attack still exists 
as long as the occupation continues.”107 
 In support of this reading, authors108 primarily refer to the illustrative list 
of “acts of aggression” in Article 3 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression,109 
a list integrated in full in Article 8bis(2) of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.110 Specifically, subparagraph (a) identifies as one “act 
of aggression” “[t]he invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, 
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force 
of the territory of another State or part thereof.”111 On its face, the clause 
signals that it is not just the initial “invasion or attack” resulting in occupation 
that constitutes an act of aggression, but also the resulting “military occupa-
tion,” irrespective of its length. 
Some authors112 further draw attention to Article 14(2) of the Interna-
tional Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, which affirms that 
internationally wrongful acts can have “a continuing character,” implying 
that the illegality extends “over the entire period during which the act con-
tinues and remains not in conformity with the international obligation.”113 
The International Law Commission’s commentary highlights various exam-
ples of continuing wrongful acts, including, most notably, “unlawful occu-
pation of part of the territory of another State or stationing armed forces in 
another State without its consent.”114 
At the same time—and leaving aside, for the time being, relevant State 
practice115—the above arguments supporting occupation as a continuing 
armed attack call for some observations. 
 
107. Reply and Defence to Counter-claim, supra note 94, ¶ 7.47. 
108. Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 28; Corten, Koutroulis & Dubuisson, supra 
note 106. 
109. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 71, art. 3. 
110. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8bis(2), July 1, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
111. Id. art 8bis(2)(a); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 71, art. 3(a).  
112. CORTEN, supra note 64, at 766; LONGOBARDO, supra note 34, at 121. 
113. G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, art. 14(2), Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter ARSIWA].  
114. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 30, 60, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/ 
Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC Commentary]. 











First, the reference to the notion of a “continuing” breach under Article 
14 seems beside the point. As a preliminary matter, one must, of course, 
distinguish between the continuation of a “breach” and the continuation of 
its “effects.”116 Consider, for instance, the State of Colnago unlawfully 
launching territorial incursions into the State of Pinarello, resulting in an in-
ternational armed conflict between the two. In that conflict, Colnago kills 
several Pinarello troops and takes hundreds of prisoners of war. In addition, 
it takes possession of numerous valuable works of art from Pinarello, which 
are taken to Colnago. Let us assume that, when the guns finally fall silent, 
Colnago continues to detain numerous prisoners of war and refuses to return 
the stolen works of art. Certainly, the fact that these POWs and artworks 
remain in the hands of Colnago can be seen as a continuing consequence of 
Colnago’s unlawful resort to force—which may moreover entail (a) separate 
breach(es) of international (humanitarian) law117—yet, it does not ipso facto 
mean that the prohibited use of force itself is continuing, let alone that there 
is an ongoing armed attack. 
 One could argue that the situation is qualitatively different when Colnago 
retains control over part of the territory of Pinarello. In this case, it is the 
breach of the prohibition on the use of force itself (and possibly also of the 
right of self-determination) that is continuing, rather than merely its conse-
quences—as the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Respon-
sibility commentary appears to affirm.118 Even so, this does not necessarily 
imply that there is also a continuing armed attack within the meaning of Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter.  
 Indeed, the notions of “use of force” and “armed attack” have different 
meanings and functions. The use of force is linked to a prohibitive norm of 
international law, the breach of which gives rise to State responsibility. The 
concept of armed attack, by contrast, serves as the trigger to determine 
 
116. As Crawford explains, this distinction is not always easy to make (as illustrated by 
case-law on expropriation). Nor is it always easy to distinguish between instantaneous and 
continuing breaches. See JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 
254–64 (2013). 
117. Such as if prisoners of war are not returned “without delay” upon the end of the 
conflict in accordance with Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention. Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135. In relation to the unlawfulness arising from the seizure of works of art, see 
Rule 40. Respect for Cultural Property, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule40. 
118. But see, however, infra, on the travaux of the Definition of Aggression, where this 











whether a victim State can exercise its right of self-defense. Put differently: 
there is no autonomous prohibition of armed attack as a norm of primary 
international law. In sum, the concept of a continuing breach under Article 
14(2), Articles on State Responsibility, is ill-suited for examining the tem-
poral scope of an armed attack. 
 Second, as is well-known, the language of Article 51 refers to self-defense 
“if an armed attack occurs.” This language—specifically the word “occurs,” 
as well as the notion of an “attack”—suggests a more or less instantaneous 
event or a series of events happening at a particular point in time, i.e., the 
initial invasion resulting in occupation, rather than a prolonged state of af-
fairs characterized by an absence of active hostilities. Put differently, it seems 
counter-intuitive to hold that an “attack” is “occurring” when a State con-
tinuously and peacefully administers an area for a period of years—even if 
unlawfully. This textual argument is, however, objected to by some,119 and is 
admittedly not dispositive on its own. 
 Third, caution is needed in relying on Article 3 of the General Assem-
bly’s Definition of Aggression to define the concept of armed attack under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. On the one hand, many UN members admit-
tedly saw the drafting of the Definition of Aggression as an exercise in cir-
cumscribing the scope of lawful self-defense.120 Furthermore, the value of 
the Definition of Aggression in interpreting the notion of armed attack—
whether as a collective expression of opinio juris and/or as a subsequent agree-
ment or subsequent practice in the sense of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties121—was further embraced in the Nicaragua 
judgment, where the ICJ famously relied on Article 3(g) of the Definition of 
Aggression resolution to conceptualize self-defense in situations of indirect 
military aggression.122 On the other hand, one cannot overlook the fact that 
many States involved in the work of the Fourth Special Committee on the 
Question of Defining Aggression saw the resolution as an attempt to eluci-
date the notion of act of aggression for purposes of determining the Chapter 
 
119. See Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 28. 
120. For instance, the Thirteen-Power proposal submitted by Colombia, Cyprus, Ec-
uador, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Spain, Uganda, Uruguay, and 
Yugoslavia included a definition of armed attack as the most serious and dangerous 
form of aggression. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/L.16. 
121. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 
122. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-











VII powers of the Security Council under Article 39123—moreover, doing so 
in a non-binding manner. Thus, Article 6 further stipulates that “[n]othing 
in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing 
the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which 
the use of force is lawful.”124 A majority in legal doctrine would seem to agree 
that the 1974 resolution does not directly restrict or expand the scope for 
lawful self-defense.125 As one of the present authors has noted elsewhere, the 
Definition of Aggression may well provide a useful point of departure to 
indirectly examine the scope of self-defense, yet it is certainly not the final 
word.126 In particular, due consideration must be paid to other elements, in-
cluding the travaux of the resolution and customary practice.127 
Upon closer scrutiny, the Fourth Special Committee discussions preced-
ing the inclusion of the reference to “occupation” in Article 3(a) of the 
UNGA Definition of Aggression indicate that the debate focused mostly on 
whether occupation ought to be seen as an act of aggression or a consequence 
thereof, rather than whether occupation would justify the use of self-defense 
to recover occupied land. Thus, U.S. delegate (and later ICJ judge) Stephen 
Schwebel defended the absence of any reference to occupation in the Six-
Power Draft, arguing, 
  
[m]ilitary occupation and annexation were consequences of aggression, 
since they always followed the use of armed force. As the Committee was 
trying to determine what forms of the use of force constituted aggression, 
it would be inappropriate to introduce such matters as military occupation 
and annexation into the definition. 128 
 
This position was challenged by several countries who expressly disagreed 
that occupation and annexation were mere consequences of aggression but 
 
123. U.N. Charter art. 39.  
124. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 71, art. 6.  
125. See RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK,” supra note 82, at 137 (with references in note 58). 
126. See id. at 138–39. 
127. Id. 
128. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Summary Records of 
the Sixty-Seventh to Seventy-Eighth Meetings, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.67-78, at 66 (Oct. 
19, 1970). Consider also the position of Iraq in the same debate: “The acquisition of territory 
by force was a consequence of aggression, but the definition could not remain silent on the 











should instead be regarded as acts of aggression of an indefinite or perma-
nent character in and of themselves.129 Against this, the United Kingdom 
and Canada cautioned against the view that any form of occupation would 
ipso facto constitute aggression since some temporary occupations could be 
justified as an exercise of self-defense.130 In response, the Syrian delegate 
clarified that the Thirteen-Power draft “was not dealing with legal occupa-
tion, but only with occupation in violation of the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter; occupation in the exercise of the right of self-defense was 
consequently not included . . . .”131 Reflecting the overall mood, France ob-
served that “[t]he discussion had shown that the occupation and annexation 
of territory were closer to aggression itself than to its consequences,” and 
therefore merited a place in the envisaged resolution.132  
Ultimately, however, hardly any State drew a link between the qualifica-
tion of occupation as an act of aggression and the possible recourse to self-
defense to regain occupied territory. The only two exceptions were (unsur-
prisingly) Syria and Egypt,133 the two most vocal proponents of the inclusion 
of a reference to occupation, both of which noted in passing that military 
occupation gave the occupied country the right to use self-defense.134 Both 
 
129. See id. at 65 (Syria), 66 (Turkey), 67 (United Arab Republic: qualifying both occu-
pation and annexation as “continuing acts of aggression”), 68 (Uruguay: asserting that “oc-
cupation and forcible annexation were not merely consequences of invasion, but were them-
selves acts of aggression”), 74 (Bulgaria), 84 (United Arab Republic), 136 (United Arab Re-
public). See also Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Summary Rec-
ords of the Seventy-Ninth to Ninety-First Meetings, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.79-91 (Feb. 
8, 1971), at 40 (Syria), 63 (Ghana), 68 (Romania). 
130. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, supra note 128, at 72–
73 (United Kingdom: “[disagreeing] with the Thirteen Powers that any military occupation, 
however temporary, was ipso facto aggression; it might become aggression in certain cir-
cumstances, for example, when occupation was no longer justified as an exercise of self-
defence”), 73–74 (Canada: “[T]he USSR representative must agree that not all military oc-
cupation was aggression; for example, there was the case of territories occupied, and in some 
cases annexed, both before and after the Second World War.”). 
131. Id. at 74–75 (Syria). 
132. Id. at 82 (France). 
133. Recall that the discussion took place in 1970, just three years after the Six-Day 
War.  
134. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, supra note 128, at 100 
(United Arab Republic: “The right of self-defence of [States whose territories were occu-
pied] did not derive from declarations or pronouncements on self-determination; it derived 
from Article 51 of the UN Charter.”), 102 (Syria: insisting there was “confusion between 
self-determination and the right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter. 











would reiterate this position not long thereafter in the UN debates over the 
Yom Kippur War.135 However, other States did not expressly consider the 
link between occupation and self-defense, and there was no discussion of 
the temporal limitation of the right to self-defense in this context. 
In the end, the authors do not believe that reliance on the Definition of 
Aggression settles the matter in favor of a continuing right of self-defense as 
long as the occupation continues—and would instead argue that the General 
Assembly’s Friendly Relations Declaration136 tilts the balance in the opposite 
direction. 
 
B. The Principle of the Non-Use of Force in International Relations 
 
1. The Duty to Refrain from the Use of Force as a Means of Settling 
Territorial Disputes 
 
Like the Definition of Aggression, the Friendly Relations Declaration has 
been relied upon by the ICJ and has at times been regarded as a codification 
of customary international law.137 For present purposes, two clauses from 
the resolution, specifically from the section related to the principle of the 
non-use of force, merit further scrutiny. The relevant parts read as follows: 
 
Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force . . . 
as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes 
and problems concerning frontiers of States. 
Every State likewise has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of 
force to violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, 
established by or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a 
party or which it is otherwise bound to respect.138 
 
 
can also be made to the statement of Sudan in the same debate, which criticized the idea 
that “a State which tried to regain territory occupied by foreign troops or annexed would be 
considered an aggressor.” Id. at 65. 
135. See id. at 64–66.  
136. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on the Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
137. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27). 











The present Section focuses on the former principle; the latter principle will 
be tackled in the following Section. 
First, the principle that States cannot settle territorial disputes through 
military means is itself a corollary of the prohibition on the use of force and 
the duty to settle disputes through peaceful means, norms enshrined in UN 
Charter Articles 2(4) and 2(3), respectively, and which form part of custom-
ary international law.139 It also finds explicit affirmation in the practice of the 
UN Security Council. In Resolution 1177(1998), for instance, relating to the 
conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Council affirmed “the principle 
of peaceful settlement of disputes and [stressed] that the use of armed force 
is not acceptable as a means of addressing territorial disputes or changing 
circumstances on the ground.”140 
Crucially, the principle only makes sense inasmuch as it operates irrespec-
tive of whether a State holds a valid title over land or not. If not, it would 
merely restate the prohibition of aggression by emphasizing that States can-
not forcibly annex territory over which they do not hold a valid title. Having 
regard, among other things, to the effet utile principle, it is clear that the obli-
gation also applies vis-à-vis the State that has a valid title over territory that 
is de facto administered by another State. This position also finds confirma-
tion in actual State practice. Thus, for the 1982 Falkland/Malvinas War, 
Etienne Henry notes how “even the numerous states that fully supported 
Argentina’s claims of sovereignty over the Falklands Islands (Islas Malvinas) 
disapproved the recourse to force—thus confirming the customary character 
of the prohibition of the use of force to settle territorial disputes.”141 
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission in its Partial Award on the Jus 
ad Bellum also supports this position in unequivocal terms.142 In particular, 
the Commission could not accept that Eritrea’s recourse to force would have 
been lawful on the basis that it held a valid claim over the land it sought to 
 
139. Randelzhofer & Dörr, supra note 63, at 203; Christian Tomuschat, Article 2(3), in 
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 63, at 181, 188; on 
the obligation to pursue peaceful negotiations, see further YIALLOURIDES ET AL., supra note 
96, ¶ 183. 
140. S.C. Res. 1177 pmbl. para. 3 (June 26, 1998). 
141. Henry, supra note 99, at 372; see also infra pp. 724–25 on the Falkland/Malvinas 
War. 
142. Partial Award: Jus Ad Bellum—Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 457 
(Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005) [hereinafter Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission]; The 
principle was also confirmed in the context of the maritime boundary dispute between Guy-
ana and Suriname in Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary (Guy. v. Surin.), 30 R.I.A.A. 1, 











recover.143 Referring to the Friendly Relations Declaration, as well as schol-
arly works, the Commission opined,  
 
the practice of States and the writings of eminent publicists show that self-
defense cannot be invoked to settle territorial disputes. In that connection, 
the Commission notes that border disputes between States are so frequent 
that any exception to the prohibition of the threat or use of force for terri-
tory that is allegedly occupied unlawfully would create a large and danger-
ous hole in a fundamental rule of international law.144 
 
Accordingly, although it confirmed Eritrea’s sovereignty over Badme, the 
commission held that Eritrea had breached Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
“by resorting to armed force . . . to attack and occupy the town of Badme, 
then under peaceful administration by [Ethiopia].”145 
The present authors broadly agree with the position put forth by the 
commission. And while some will disagree, we find ourselves in fine com-
pany. Thus, in his seminal piece in the Michigan Law Review, Schachter notes 
how an exception for recovering “illegally occupied” territory would render 
Article 2(4) meaningless in many cases.146 In sum, the obligation to settle 
territorial disputes through peaceful means prima facie pushes against any 
entitlement to use force to recover occupied territory peacefully adminis-
tered by another State for a prolonged period of time. Marcelo Kohen, in 
turn, arrives at the same conclusion, in part by drawing an analogy with the 
concept of “protection possessoire” under domestic law: 
 
La portée de l'interdiction de … la menace et de l'emploi de la force (ONU) est donc de 
proscrire tout changement territorial par la force. On peut parler en ce sens d'une protec-
tion de la possession, quelle que soit la nature de celle-ci. Ainsi, même celui qui possède 
illégalement un territoire saura que le droit international n'autorise pas le titulaire de la 
souveraineté de se faire justice soi-même.147 
 
143. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 142, ¶ 10. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. ¶ 16. 
146. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
1620, 1627–28 (1984).  
147. MARCELO KOHEN, POSSESSION CONTESTÉE ET SOUVERAINETÉ TERRITORIALE 
[CONTESTED TERRITORY AND TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY] ¶ 115 (1997) [“The scope of 
the UN prohibition on . . . the threat and use of force is therefore to prohibit any territorial 
change by force. We can speak in this sense of a protection of possession, whatever the 
nature of the latter. Thus, even those who illegally own a territory will know that interna-












In a similar vein, Quincy Wright has argued,  
  
the Charter reference to territorial integrity means de facto possession, not 
de jure title. If this were not true, and a state were free to occupy territory in 
the de facto possession of another state, to which territory it believes it has 
legal title, attacks would be permissible in every boundary dispute, and the 
barriers by which the Charter seeks to protect territorial integrity would be 
broken down.148 
 
2. Territorial Disputes as Opposed to . . . Unlawful Occupation? 
 
Let us again turn to the counterargument put forward by scholars that argue 
in favor of a continuing right of self-defense to recover unlawfully occupied 
territory. In essence, this argument holds that the concept of “territorial dis-
putes” must be narrowly construed. Two sub-strands can be distinguished. 
First, it has been suggested that no territorial dispute exists where an 
occupying State has not explicitly laid a claim over the territory it occupies.149 
Thus, with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh, Olivier Corten draws attention to 
the fact that Armenia had not claimed title over the territory prior to the 
eruption of the 2020 conflict, implying that there was allegedly no territorial 
dispute which States were obliged to settle through peaceful means. If this 
line of reasoning is followed through, the same conclusion should, mutatis 
mutandis, be upheld with regard to various other territories that are (at least 
partly) controlled by a third State, including the Turkish Republic of North-
ern Cyprus (by Turkey), or Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia (by 
Russia).150 These “frozen conflicts” would not involve a territorial dispute 
for lack of an explicit territorial claim by the occupying State. 
 
148. Wright, supra note 100, at 623. 
149. François Dubuisson & Vaios Koutroulis, The Yom Kippur War—1973, in THE USE 
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 99, at 189, 199; 
Corten, Koutroulis & Dubuisson, supra note 106; YIALLOURIDES ET AL., supra note 96, ¶¶ 
7–9. (They also define a “territorial dispute” as one involving a dispute where “two or more 
States are making competing sovereignty claims over continental territories or islands,” alt-
hough they acknowledge that the existence of a territorial dispute may not always be self-
evident.). 
150. See Cyprus, RULAC, https://www.rulac.org/browse/countries/cyprus (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2021) (“Since 1974, Turkey has occupied the northern part of Cyprus”); see also 
Military Occupation of Georgia by Russia, RULAC, https://www.rulac.org/browse/con-
flicts/military-occupation-of-georgia-by-russia (last visited Mar. 23, 2021) (“Russia is occu-











Against this, it is easy to see how problematic—and potentially counter-
productive—the attempted distinction ultimately becomes: a State would be 
able to invoke self-defense to recover unlawfully occupied territory but 
would lose that right when the occupying State asserts a claim over the ter-
ritory concerned. Thus, Syria would supposedly have been entitled to invoke 
self-defense to recover the Golan Heights lost to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day 
War but would subsequently have lost this right of self-defense when Israel 
formally annexed the territory in 1981 (supposedly creating a territorial dis-
pute that did not theretofore exist). Similarly, Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
would presumably have turned the situation into a territorial dispute (in con-
trast, for instance, to the frozen conflict over Transnistria), excluding further 
reliance on self-defense by Ukraine. In the end, the suggested interpretation 
would lead to arbitrary and absurd results and would actually provide an in-
centive for occupying powers to assert a claim over the occupied land or 
even seek to formally annex it. 
The idea that no territorial dispute exists when an occupying State has 
not formally laid out a territorial claim at the international level is also ques-
tionable for other reasons. The approach is indeed artificial in that it ignores 
the fact that the occupying State, even if not expressly claiming the territory 
for its own, will often challenge the sovereign title of the occupied State over 
the territory concerned. Thus, while Turkey has not claimed the northern 
part of Cyprus as “belonging” to the Republic of Turkey, it has nonetheless 
formally recognized the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus (and remains the only State to have done so). And while Armenia had, 
prior to the 2020 outbreak of hostilities, merely “threatened” to recognize 
the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, it has challenged the claim that the 
region forms an integral part of Azerbaijan.151 In other words, the above 
scenarios involve situations where—to paraphrase the Hague Court—“the 
claim of one party is positively opposed to the other”152 and center on the 
exercise of sovereignty over territory. 
 
https://www.rulac.org/browse/countries/moldova (last visited Mar. 23, 2021) (“Part of 
Moldovan territory is occupied by Russia. The Russian occupation extends over a strip of 
land . . . known as Transdniestria.”). 
151. Permanent Rep. of Armenia to the United Nations, Letter dated July 28, 2020 
from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the 
U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2020/6 (July 28, 2020). 
152. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, Judg-











The second and most important sub-strand seeks to distinguish situa-
tions of unlawful occupation from territorial disputes, deeming the two to 
be mutually exclusive, with the implication that the right of self-defense per-
sists in the former situation. Dapo Akande and Antonios Tzanakopoulos put 
it as follows: 
 
The distinction that needs to be drawn then is between an outstanding ter-
ritorial dispute where no force has yet been used by any of the disputing 
parties, and a situation where one party creates (or escalates) a territorial 
dispute by invading and occupying territory held by another State. While 
no force can be used by either party in the former instance, the latter in-
stance is clearly one where an armed attack has taken place, and the right 
of self-defence is triggered.153 
 
In reality, the dichotomy presented here is far less straightforward than 
those authors wish us to believe and might well be a chimera. Indeed, they 
would seem to suggest that territorial disputes appear out of thin air. In re-
ality, of course, many, if not most, territorial disputes have, in one way or 
another, been created or shaped by a prior use of force (whether years, dec-
ades, or even centuries earlier). 
By way of illustration, reference can be made to various territorial dis-
putes brought before the ICJ. Consider, for instance, Cameroon v. Nigeria.154 
In this case, Cameroon advanced a series of claims concerning Nigeria’s in-
ternational responsibility, including its continued military occupation of the 
Bakassi peninsula and the Lake Chad area.155 Thus, Cameroon argued that 
following several temporary infiltrations by the Nigerian army before 1993, 
the Nigerian armed forces had launched an attack on the peninsula “as part 
of a carefully and deliberately planned invasion” and had “subsequently 
 
153. Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 28. The authors continued:  
 
To put it differently, it is one thing to invoke alleged title to territory in order to justify the 
use of force against another state (impermissible), and quite another to respond to an armed 
attack of another state that has led to the occupation of territory you previously held (with-
out having occupied it through resort to force). In the former instance we have an attempt 
to settle a territorial dispute by force (which is impermissible). In the latter, we have an 
instance of the use of force in self-defence, even though it may still be possible that the title 
to territory continues to be in dispute, and such dispute has to be resolved by peaceful 
means since no use of force can lead to annexation or otherwise lawful title to territory. 
 
154. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Ni-
geria; Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303 (Oct. 10, 2002). 











maintained and advanced its occupation.”156 In Cameroon’s view, these ac-
tions were contrary to UN Charter Article 2(4) and the principle of non-
intervention.157 The Court circumvented the application of Article 2(4) but 
agreed that “sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula lies with the Republic of 
Cameroon” and ordered “the evacuation of the Cameroonian territory occu-
pied by Nigeria.”158  
Similarly, in Costa Rica v Nicaragua,159 Costa Rica argued that in 2010, Nic-
aragua had breached the prohibition on the use of force by sending “military 
units and other personnel” into a border area, which the Court ultimately 
found to belong to Costa Rica.160 Again, the Court found it unnecessary to 
pronounce on whether Nicaragua had breached Article 2(4) because it had 
 
156. Land and Maritime Boundary, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 310.  
 
In respect of the Lake Chad area, Cameroon states that Nigerian fishermen have over 
recent decades gradually settled on Cameroonian territory as the lake has receded. Accord-
ing to Cameroon, from the middle of the 1980s the Nigerian army made repeated incursions 
into the Cameroonian territory on which those fishermen had settled. Those incidents are 
alleged to have been followed by a full-scale invasion beginning in 1987, so that by 1994 a 
total of 18 villages and 6 islands were occupied by Nigeria and continue to be so occupied.  
In respect of Bakassi, Cameroon states that before 1993 the Nigerian army had on 
several occasions temporarily infiltrated into the peninsula and had even attempted in 1990 
to establish a ‘bridgehead’ at Jabane, but did not maintain any military presence in Bakassi 
at that time; Cameroon, on the contrary, had established a sub-prefecture at Idabato, to-
gether with all the administrative, military and security services appertaining thereto. Then, 
in December 1993, the Nigerian armed forces are said to have launched an attack on the 
peninsula as part of a carefully and deliberately planned invasion; Nigeria subsequently 
maintained and advanced its occupation, establishing a second bridgehead at Diamond in 
July 1994. In February 1996, following an attack by Nigerian troops, the Cameroonian post 
at Idabato is alleged to have fallen into Nigeria’s hands. The same fate is said to have sub-
sequently befallen the Cameroonian posts at Uzama and Kombo a Janea. These Came-
roonian territories are allegedly still occupied.  
Cameroon contends that, in thus invading and occupying its territory, Nigeria has vi-
olated, and continues to violate, its obligations under conventional and customary interna-
tional law. In particular, Cameroon claims that Nigeria’s actions are contrary to the principle 
of non-use of force set out in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and to 
the principle of non-intervention repeatedly upheld by the Court, as well as being incom-
patible with Cameroon’s territorial sovereignty. 
 
157. Id.  
158. Id. ¶ 319 (emphasis added). 
159. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. 
Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa 
Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665 (Dec. 16, 2015). Similar observations can be made in 
respect of the Temple of Preah Vihear case. See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. 
Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (June 15, 1962). 











“already established that the presence of military personnel of Nicaragua in 
the disputed territory was unlawful because it violated Costa Rica’s territorial 
sovereignty.”161 Several judges nonetheless strongly criticized the Court’s 
failure to pronounce on the application of Article 2(4).162 
If we attempt to fit the facts at the heart of both ICJ proceedings in the 
framework proposed by Akande and Tzanakopoulos, one would be hard-
pressed not to conclude that we are faced, on both occasions, with “a situa-
tion where one party creates (or escalates) a territorial dispute by invading and 
occupying territory held by another State,” rather than “an outstanding ter-
ritorial dispute where no force has yet been used by any of the disputing 
parties.”163 As a result, adopting the position put forth by Akande and Tza-
nakopoulos would lead to the conclusion that both Cameroon and Costa 
Rica were perfectly entitled to invoke self-defense to recover the territories 
concerned at any given point in time. More generally, the same conclusion 
would appear to impose itself in numerous other border conflicts around the 
globe (even if we use 1945, the year of adoption of the UN Charter, as the 
cut-off date and wipe the slate clean for any prior cases of unlawful occupa-
tion). Indeed, many, if not most, territorial disputes (e.g., India-Pakistan or 
India-China164) would ultimately escape from the prohibition against the use 
of force to settle territorial disputes, rendering the prohibition largely mean-
ingless. 
A more nuanced attempt to define the point where self-defense stops 
and the prohibition against the use of force to settle territorial disputes be-
gins would exclude from the latter manifest cases of unlawful occupation. 
Such an effort to seek a more balanced distinction between territorial dis-
putes covered by the principle of the non-use of force and those that are not 
is certainly laudable but comes with plenty of challenges of its own. 
Would the distinction depend on the importance of the occupied area? 
For instance, in terms of geographical scope (for example, the 260 square 
 
161. Id. ¶ 99.  
162. See, e.g., the separate opinion of Robinson, J., id. (expressing regret over the Court’s 
failure to find a breach of the prohibition on the use of force); see also the separate opinion 
by Owada, J., id. ¶ 11 (“it is my view that it would have been more appropriate for the Court 
to have gone further by declaring that these internationally wrongful acts by Nicaraguan 
authorities constituted an unlawful use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter”). 
163. Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 28. 
164. At least 120 States (or “quasi-States”) are reportedly “involved in a territorial dis-
pute of some kind, involving approximately 100 separate territories, continental, or island.” 











miles of the Bakassi peninsula versus the 1,700 square miles of Nagorno-
Karabakh), the number of inhabitants, or its economic/cultural/historical 
importance vis-à-vis the occupied State. These factors, or some combination 
thereof, may well weigh on the question of whether there is a necessity to 
act in self-defense and may, moreover, from a political standpoint, influence 
the occupied State’s decision to take action in self-defense. Yet, they hardly 
serve as useful pointers to separate (manifestly) unlawful occupations from 
other territorial disputes. 
Another, perhaps more convincing, approach would be to distinguish 
between situations of occupation resulting from a manifestly unlawful use of 
force and those where the occupying State is supposedly acting in good faith. 
This distinction to some extent echoes the argument raised by Nigeria in the 
Land and Maritime Boundary case, according to which “even if the Court 
should find that Cameroon [had] sovereignty over [the contested areas], the 
Nigerian presence there was the result of a ‘reasonable mistake’ or ‘honest 
belief.’”165 However, the risk with this approach is that the truth may be in 
the eye of the beholder: the occupying State will surely claim to be acting in 
good faith, whereas the occupied State will surely denounce any such claim. 
Again, problems abound. If an occupying State claims to have acted in good 
faith in taking control of a piece of neighboring land without encountering 
any military resistance because it believed it held valid title over the land, 
must this retroactively be considered a manifestly unlawful occupation when, 
for example, an arbitral award later finds that no such valid title exists? 
Further, is it relevant if the occupying State claims to have acted in the 
pursuit of the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of the occupied 
territory? Thus, is it of any relevance that in 1991 a large majority of the 
inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh voted in favor of independence from 
Azerbaijan?166 Or, should any weight be attached to the deeply flawed refer-
endum in Crimea that preceded the peninsula’s “integration” into the Rus-
sian Federation?167 
 
165. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Ni-
geria; Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303, ¶ 311 (Oct. 10, 2002). 
166. As explained in the Chiragov judgment, 99.9 percent of those participating in the 
referendum voted in favor of secession. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, 
138 (2015). According to a USSR census of 1989, 77 percent of the region’s population was 
ethnic Armenian, with 22 percent ethnic Azeris and Russian and Kurdish minorities. Id. ¶ 
13. 
167. Note that the referendum was boycotted by the Crimean Tatar minority and was 











And what if the occupying State asserts—rightly or not—that the occu-
pation resulted from a lawful recourse to self-defense? This is exactly the 
argument that Israel used to justify the prolonged occupation of the West 
Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula in the wake of the 1967 
Six-Day War (even though Israel did not respond to a prior armed attack, 
but acted “pre-emptively” against its Arab neighbors).168 Whatever one 
makes of the Israeli argument, the prospect of occupation resulting from the 
lawful exercise of self-defense is a real possibility. This scenario was also 
entertained during the negotiations over the Definition of Aggression, where 
several States emphasized that such occupation was not unlawful and should 
accordingly not be qualified as “aggression.”169 Yet, if one accepts—as the 
present authors do—that self-defense can never justify an indefinite occupa-
tion of foreign land (for example, in the form of a purported “buffer zone” 
established for security reasons), and that such occupation must be brought 
to an end within a reasonable period lest it breach, inter alia, the right of self-
determination and the territorial integrity of the affected country, the ques-
tion remains what happens if the occupying State fails to do so. Are we then 
confronted with a manifestly unlawful occupation that does not enjoy pro-
tection under the principle of the non-use of force, or does the lawful start 
of the occupation dictate otherwise? 
The preceding questions also illustrate that any attempt to distinguish 
between territorial disputes and unlawful occupations not caught by the prin-
ciple on the non-use of force quickly collapses into a question of authority: 
who decides whether a situation of unlawful occupation exists? The obvious 
response would be to look at international judicial organs, primarily the ICJ, 
to provide the answer. At the same time, there is something patently absurd 
in the notion that a ruling by an international court or tribunal determining 
title over contested land would serve, not to achieve a peaceful resolution of 
the dispute, but would instead provide the green light for the State holding 
valid title to use military force to recover the land concerned. Relying on the 
UN Security Council and the General Assembly for authoritative guidance 
 
Driest, Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right of Self-Determination and (Reme-
dial) Secession in International Law, 62 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 329 
(2015); Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis: An International Law Perspective, 74 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [MAGAZINE FOR FOR-
EIGN PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] 367, 380–82 (2014). 
168. On this particular conflict, see JOHN QUIGLEY, THE SIX-DAY WAR AND ISRAELI 
SELF-DEFENSE: QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR PREVENTIVE WAR (2013); see also 
Green, supra note 89, at 114. 











comes with pitfalls of its own, which are essentially linked to the political 
nature of both organs, and the impact of the veto power at the Security 
Council. Thus, while the Security Council often refrains from expressly tak-
ing a position with regard to inter-State recourse to force,170 the General As-
sembly, when it does so, often proves to be highly divided.  
By way of illustration, it is worth recalling that, while most international 
lawyers regard the Russian intervention in Crimea as a clear breach of the 
prohibition on the use of force,171 (unsurprisingly) no action was undertaken 
by the Security Council. The General Assembly, for its part, has repeatedly 
condemned the “ongoing temporary occupation of [Crimea]” by the Russian 
Federation, thereby urging “the occupying Power” to end the occupation 
“without delay.”172 At the same time, the voting record on these resolutions 
is hardly impressive and suggests that less than a third of UN members ac-
tually voted in favor.173  
As for Nagorno-Karabakh itself, several pre-1994 Security Council res-
olutions did call for the withdrawal of occupying forces from Azerbaijan, but 
the Council has since remained silent. The General Assembly adopted a res-
olution in 2008 similarly calling for the “withdrawal of all Armenian forces 
from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan,”174 yet the 
resolution was adopted with as few as thirty-nine votes in favor, seven votes 
against, and 100 abstentions. 
In the end, attempts to carve out an exception from the principle of the 
non-use of force for situations of unlawful occupation (especially by regard-
ing the latter as situations of continuous armed attack) fail to convince. In-
stead, the better view seems to be that the obligation to settle territorial dis-
putes through peaceful means prima facie pushes against any entitlement to 
 
170. As Greenwood points out, “in most armed conflicts there is no authoritative de-
termination by the Security Council of which party is the aggressor, both parties usually 
claim to be acting in self-defence.” Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal 
Basis, in The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 8 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 
2008). 
171. See, e.g., Robin Geiss, Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of International Law 
Grind Slowly but They Do Grind, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 425, 426 (2015); Olivier 
Corten, The Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Crisis: Was Jus Contra Bellum ‘Confirmed Rather 
Than Weakened’?, 2 JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2015). 
172. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 74/17 (Dec. 9, 2019). 
173. Id. The Resolution passed with a vote of sixty-three in favor, nineteen against, and 
sixty-six abstentions; see also G.A. Res. 74/168 (Jan. 21, 2020), with sixty-five in favor, 
twenty-three against, and eighty-three abstentions. 











use force to recover occupied territory that is peacefully administered by an-
other State for a prolonged period.  
The question remains to what extent this position is confirmed, or rather 
rejected, by the Friendly Relations Declaration’s reference to “international 
lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines.” This is the question we turn to 
next. 
 
3. Relevance or Irrelevance of International Lines of Demarcation 
and Armistice Lines 
 
As set forth above, the text of the Friendly Relations Declaration prohibits 
the use of force to settle territorial disputes. The second paragraph set forth 
there reads as follows in its entirety: 
 
Every State likewise has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of 
force to violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, 
established by or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a 
party or which it is otherwise bound to respect. Nothing in the foregoing 
shall be construed as prejudicing the positions of the parties concerned 
with regard to the status and effects of such lines under their special re-
gimes or as affecting their temporary character. 175 
 
The statement relates to international lines of demarcation that are “es-
tablished by or pursuant to an international agreement” to which the State 
concerned is a party—in other words, a bilateral or multilateral treaty. It also 
covers any agreement which a State “is otherwise bound to respect,” the 
obvious example being a line of demarcation imposed by the Security Coun-
cil pursuant to its Chapter VII powers. 
“Demarcation lines” are provisional borderlines separating territories 
under different jurisdictions.176 As Jochen von Bernstorff explains, they sep-
arate territories between States or within territories governed by one or more 
occupying powers or in the context of secession. While they are used “for 
transitional purposes only, during this time they in principle fulfil the same 
 
175. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 136, annex, ¶ 1, para 4 .  
176. Jochen von Bernstorff, Demarcation Line, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB-













functions as a final State boundary.”177 For this reason, “they should be dif-
ferentiated from military front lines in the context of a ceasefire agreement 
during an armed conflict, which [does] not fulfil the same function as a State 
boundary.”178 
“Armistice lines” then are, as the quote from the Friendly Relations Dec-
laration suggests, a specific sub-category of demarcation lines. According to 
Yoram Dinstein, an armistice is “an agreement concluded between two or 
more States waging war against each other.”179 As Dinstein explains, how-
ever, there is some confusion concerning the specific meaning of the con-
cept, particularly its relationship to the parallel concept of ceasefire under 
the law of armed conflict. In particular, until the two World Wars, an armi-
stice meant an agreement designed to bring about a mere suspension of hos-
tilities between belligerent parties who remained locked in a state of war with 
each other,180 whereas “under contemporary international law, the locution 
employed in the general practice of States for a suspension of hostilities is 
ceasefire (or truce). As for armistice, its meaning has been transformed from 
suspension of hostilities to termination of war, without, however, introduc-
ing peace in the full sense of that term.”181 
Thus, according to Dinstein, the provisions in the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions relating to armistices  
 
have to be read today as applicable to ceasefire, rather than to armistice. A 
modern armistice agreement divests the parties of the right to renew mili-
tary operations at any time and under any circumstances whatsoever. By 
putting an end to war, an armistice today does not brook resumption of 
hostilities as an option.182  
 
Accordingly, a genuine armistice can never be “local” but must necessarily 




179. Yoram Dinstein, Armistice, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (updated Sept. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law: 
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also DINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 44. 
180. Dinstein, Armistice, supra note 179, ¶ 1. 
181. Id. 
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An example of a short-term ceasefire can be found in Security Council 
Resolution 50 (1948), adopted in the context of the Israeli-Arab war, which 
called for “a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four 
weeks.”184 Distinguishing between short-term ceasefires and armistices 
proper, however, is no straightforward exercise, in part due to the “semantic 
confusion” in the usage of the terms,185 and because parties often conclude 
a ceasefire agreement without providing for a specific duration, while a tem-
porary ceasefire may well lapse without any resumption of hostilities occur-
ring. 
The ceasefire that factually ended the 1994 war over Nagorno-Karabakh 
and which paved the way for a new territorial status quo that would continue 
until 2020 is a case in point. Following various short-term ceasefires in the 
summer of 1993,186 on May 11, 1994, the Ministers of Defence of Azerbaijan 
and Armenia and the “Nagorno Karabakh Army Commander” concluded a 
tripartite “ceasefire agreement,” putting in place a “full cease-fire and cessa-
tion of hostilities.”187 The agreement would be “used to complete the nego-
tiations in the next 10 days and conclude an Agreement on Cessation of the 
Armed Conflict no later than May 22 [1994].”188 On July 26, 1994, the same 
actors concluded another agreement confirming their commitment to the 
ceasefire.189 The final paragraph of the (short) agreement asserts that the par-
 
184. S.C. Res. 50, ¶ 1 (May 29, 1948). 
185. Sydney D. Bailey, Cease-Fires, Truces, and Armistices in the Practice of the UN Security 
Council, 71 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 461, 467–69 (1977). 
186. Before the adoption of the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the parties had previously 
agreed (particularly in the summer of 1993) to a range of temporary ceasefires, initially par-
tial, and subsequently general. The list of agreements includes the Agreement on the Cessa-
tion of Shelling of Stepanakert and Agdam (June 17, 1993), the Agreement on the Cessation 
of Hostilities in the Area between Magadiz and Agdam (June 27, 1993), the Agreement on 
a Universal Ceasefire for a period of three days (July 25, 1993), the agreement to extend the 
ceasefire for a period of seven days (July 28, 1993), and the subsequent agreement to extend 
the ceasefire for a period of three days (August 5, 1993). Translations of these agreements 
are found on the University of Edinburgh’s Peace Agreements Database. Peace Agreements 
Database, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, https://www.peaceagreements.org/search (last vis-
ited Mar. 23, 2021).  
187. Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement, supra note 6. The agreement was adopted a week 
after the Bishkek Protocol, a provisional ceasefire, had called for the conclusion of a definite 
agreement between the parties. See supra note 6. 
188. Bishkek Ceasefire Agreement, supra note 6, ¶ 3. 












ties agree “to maintain the ceasefire regime until the signing of a compre-
hensive political agreement which provides for the total cessation of hostili-
ties.”190 While no specific timeframe was provided for, a preceding paragraph 
confirmed the parties’ aim “to intensify efforts to complete the comprehen-
sive political agreement within 30 days of August 1994.” On February 4, 
1995, the same protagonists agreed to a set of measures proposed by the 
OSCE with a view to “strengthening” the existing ceasefire regime, in par-
ticular by putting in place a mechanism to deal with and de-escalate possible 
breaches of the ceasefire (e.g., through exchanges of information, and a com-
mitment not to engage in reciprocal actions that could lead to the aggrava-
tion of an incident).191 These obligations became effective on February 6. 
The agreement contained no time limitation. To the authors’ knowledge, no 
further ceasefire or armistice agreements were concluded in subsequent 
years, although several joint statements were adopted stressing the need to 
seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the conflict based on the principles of 
international law and the UN Charter.192 
Ultimately, while the cited passage from the Friendly Relations Declara-
tion refers to “armistice lines,” it can be assumed that the statement applies 
equally to ceasefire lines—a position that finds support in the resolution’s 
travaux.193 But how must this statement ultimately be understood, and what 
is its impact for the recovery of occupied territory?  
 
190. Id. para. 3.  
191. Agreement on Strengthening the Ceasefire (Feb. 4, 1995), https://www.peaceag 
reements.org/viewmasterdocument/1684. 
192. See, e.g., Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group 
Co-Chair Countries and the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia at the OSCE Summit in 
Astana, OSCE (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.osce.org/home/74234; Joint Statement by the 
Presidents of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, and the Russian Feder-
ation on the Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement (Mar. 5, 2011), https://www.peaceagree-
ments.org/viewmasterdocument/1687.  
193. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. A/7326 (1968) 
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be violated by force without infringing Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.” (emphasis 
added)). Note, however, Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. 
A/8018 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Report of the Special Committee on Principles of Interna-
tional Law] (referring to a suggestion “that an interpretive text on the difference between 











Two points would seem to be rather uncontroversial. First, a binding 
agreement (or Security Council resolution) that imposes a ceasefire along a 
specific line of demarcation for a specified duration must be respected by 
the States concerned. A breach of such an agreement is not regarded 
“merely” as contravening a conventional norm but also as an infringement 
of the general prohibition of the use of force, the cornerstone of the UN 
Charter.194 
Second, agreements (or Security Council resolutions) providing for an 
international line of demarcation, even if concluded for an extended period 
of time or for an indefinite duration, do not of themselves alter title over 
territory. More specifically, the occupying State does not acquire a title over 
the occupied land merely because of the agreement (or resolution). Change 
in sovereign title over territory can come about only when the other State 
validly consents to it, e.g., as part of a comprehensive peace agreement.195 
This follows from the Friendly Relations Declaration’s assertion that inter-
national lines of demarcation (notwithstanding their protection by the prin-
ciple of the non-use of force) do not prejudice the parties’ positions regard-
ing status and are temporary. 
The more difficult question then is what this means when an agreement 
puts in place a temporary ceasefire or when it provides for an armistice or a 
ceasefire of indefinite duration. Can an occupied State lawfully resume hos-
tilities in these scenarios? 
Some argue that the “temporary” character of lines of demarcation also 
entails that the principle of the non-use of force applies only temporarily. 
Thus, once the specific duration agreed to in a ceasefire agreement lapses, 
hostilities can lawfully be resumed by the defending State. According to 
Akande and Tzanakopoulos, the same applies mutatis mutandis to ceasefire 
and armistice agreements concluded for an indefinite period.196 According 
 
194. E.g., Constantine Antonopoulos, The Unilateral Use of Force by States in Inter-
national Law 181 (1997) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nottingham) (“To use force 
across an armistice line entails the same effect as the crossing of existing and permanent 
boundaries in every respect but for the name of the line crossed. For, in both cases force 
serves as the means to promote settlement of the dispute unilaterally by the imposition of 
the claim of the State that resorts to force against the other party to the dispute without the 
latter being offered any opportunity whatever to argue its case.”). 
195. On the validity of a treaty of peace, see, e.g., DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND 
SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 41–44; Serena Forlati, Coercion as a Ground Affecting the Va-
lidity of Peace Treaties, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 320 
(Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011). 











to them, the conclusion of such an agreement temporarily removes the ne-
cessity for acting in self-defense since it provides time to seek other, peaceful 
means to deal with the armed attack that has taken place. However, “when 
this armistice line is no longer ‘temporary,’ rather it turns into status quo, then 
at some point it becomes necessary again to use force in self-defense, all 
other means to repel the armed attack having failed.”197 In sum, under this 
view, when no definite duration is provided, it is for the occupied State to 
assess whether peaceful means have been exhausted or not. If it finds the 
answer to be negative, in that case, it is supposedly at liberty to resume the 
exercise of its original right of self-defense, whether weeks, months, or even 
years after the conclusion of the original ceasefire or armistice agreement.198 
 
Greenwood, however, explains,   
 
 
197. Id. This position bears some resemblance to the approach of Dinstein with respect 
to ceasefire agreements of indefinite duration. According to Dinstein, such agreements 
“ought to be read as undertaken for a reasonable period.” “[W]hen a reasonable period has 
elapsed,” the continued operation of the agreement is deemed to “depend on the goodwill 
of both Belligerent Parties, and the ceasefire may be unilaterally denounced at will.” DIN-
STEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 62. The main difference, 
of course, is that Dinstein does not limit this view to cases of unlawful occupation, but to 
any large-scale international armed conflict. Furthermore, as explained above in Section 
III(A), Dinstein is of the (minority) position that as long as a state of war continues between 
two States, the jus ad bellum is of no relevance.  
198. This is also the position set forth by Yoram Dinstein concerning the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. In 2008, Azerbaijan sent a letter to the Secretary-General to the United 
Nations, annexing a document titled “Report of the Legal Consequences of Armed Aggres-
sion by the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan.” While at the time the 
authorship of the report was not disclosed, further communications from Azerbaijan ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General in 2017 (U.N. Doc. S/2017/316) and 2021 (U.N. Doc. 
S/2021/39) revealed that the drafting of the cited report was commissioned to Dinstein. In 
the report, it is argued that, 
  
A cease-fire, even when long-standing, is not meant to last forever qua cease-fire. A cease-
fire is merely supposed to be a springboard for diplomatic action . . . . This is precisely what 
the Republic of Azerbaijan has been striving to accomplish all these years. But, once the 
Republic of Azerbaijan arrives at the firm conclusion that a peaceful settlement—based on 
withdrawal by the Republic of Armenia from Nagorny Karabakh and surrounding areas—
is unattainable, it is entitled to terminate the cease-fire and resume the exercise of self-de-
fence. 
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the Permanent Rep. of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 











[t]he changes in the law regarding resort to force brought about by the 
adoption of the UN Charter have had a particular effect on the right of the 
parties to resume hostilities after the conclusion of an armistice or ceasefire 
of indefinite duration. Whereas the law once admitted there was a general 
right to resume hostilities (Article 36 Hague Reg), today it would be a vio-
lation of Article 2(4) for a state to resume hostilities unless the behavior of 
the other party to the armistice or ceasefire amounted to an armed attack 
or the threat of an armed attack.199  
 
According to this view, a new armed attack is required to permit the lawful 
resumption of hostilities. The mere fact that part of the State’s territory re-
mains occupied and that negotiations have not produced the desired break-
through does not of itself “revive” the right of self-defense. 
A closer look at the travaux of the Friendly Relations Declaration reveals 
that many States were keen on asserting that the peaceful maintenance of 
international lines of demarcation was consistent with the purpose of the 
UN Charter and that the use of force to violate them contravened Article 
2(4).200 At the same time, States stressed that there should be no recognition 
 
199. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 170, at 45, 68. 
200. See, e.g., Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States 22, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.66 (Dec. 4, 1967) 
[hereinafter 1967 Special Committee on Principles of International Law] (Australia: “the 
peaceful maintenance of such international lines of demarcation was manifestly in accord-
ance with the purposes of the United Nations and the use or threat of force to violate them 
was contrary to the spirit of Article 2(4)”); 1968 Report of the Special Committee on Prin-
ciples of International Law, supra note 193, ¶¶ 23, 67–68 (joint proposal by Australia, Can-
ada, the United Kingdom, and the United States according to which “every State has the 
duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing boundaries of another 
State or other international lines of demarcation, or as a means of solving international dis-
putes, including territorial disputes”), 24 (an identical proposal by the United Kingdom), 26 
(an identical joint proposal by Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela), 111 
(Report of the Drafting Committee, ¶ 3), 119 (United Kingdom), 131 (Australia); Special 
Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-oper-
ation among States, 47, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.114 (May 1, 1970) [hereinafter 1970 Spe-
cial Committee on Principles of International Law] (France); Report of the Special Com-
mittee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States 13, 18, 19, 21, 27–28 (¶¶ 62–68), U.N. Doc. A/7619 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 
Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law]; 1970 Report of the 
Special Committee on Principles of International Law, supra note 193, at 29, ¶¶ 258 (United 











of military occupation or territorial acquisition achieved by force,201 that ar-
mistice and ceasefire agreements “carried no implication as to the status of 
the territories they divided,” and that international lines of demarcation 
should not be placed on the same footing as international boundaries.202 
The negotiations do not reveal any significant evidence to support the 
view put forth by Akande and Tzanakopoulos, according to which the ref-
erence to the “temporary” character of international lines of demarcation 
was meant to preserve the right of self-defense of occupied States; specifi-
cally to enable them to reopen hostilities if political negotiations proved un-
successful over time. To the present authors’ knowledge, only one State ex-
plicitly questioned the continued application of the principle of non-use of 
force to international lines of demarcation. Syria, while expressing support 
for the relevant paragraph in the Friendly Relations Declaration, did so 
 
on the understanding that no concept of inviolability should be attached to 
any line of demarcation resulting from an act or war of aggression. Inter-
national demarcation lines and armistice lines, because of their very tem-
porary nature, could not benefit from the inviolability accorded to national 
and historical boundaries where such demarcation lines and armistice lines 
were the outcome of the unjustified use of force.203 
 
 
201. See, e.g., 1967 Special Committee on Principles of International Law, supra note 
200, at 19 (Argentina), 21 (Madagascar); 1968 Report of the Special Committee on Principles 
of International Law, supra note 193, ¶ 129 (Lebanon); 1969 Report of the Special Commit-
tee on Principles of International Law, supra note 200, at 20 (proposal by Algeria, Cameroon, 
Ghana, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia), 
21, 23, 30, 39–40, 46 (Romania). 
202. See, e.g., 1968 Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law, 
supra note 193, ¶¶ 66, 68–69, 75–76, at 40 (Report of the Drafting Committee, ¶ 3); 1970 
Special Committee on Principles of International Law, supra note 200, at 47 (France); 1969 
Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law, supra note 200, ¶ 68, 
at 38. 
203. 1970 Special Committee on Principles of International Law, supra note 200, at 64 
(Syria), ¶ 258, ¶ 207 (Syria). See also, more ambiguously, 1969 Report of the Special Com-
mittee on Principles of International Law, supra note 200, ¶ 127 (Syria: “International lines 
of demarcation could only exist as a result of binding international agreements, and no for-
mulation could sanction de facto situations that had arisen as a result of aggressive action.”); 
1968 Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law, supra note 193, ¶ 
123 (Syria, stressing that “none of the agreed statements in the report on non-use of force 
affected the right of peoples of occupied territories to employ against the aggressor any 
form of self-defence they saw fit”— but note how the statement refers to the “peoples of 











The Syrian statement does not explain how and when the right of self-de-
fense of the occupied State would revive. Nor did other States echo the Syr-
ian position throughout the negotiations. 
In light of the foregoing, the present authors do not believe that the sole 
reference to the “temporary” character of international lines of demarcation 
can erode the prohibition against the use of force to settle territorial disputes, 
as discussed above. Of course, that is not to say that a State that has suffered 
an armed attack whereby it has lost control over part of its territory, and 
which agrees, for instance, to a three-day ceasefire, instantaneously forfeits 
its right of self-defense ad infinitum. In the following Section, we try to make 
sense of how the right of self-defense interacts (or might interact) with the 
principle of the non-use of force to settle territorial disputes in a range of 
scenarios. 
 
C. Making Sense of the Interaction Between Self-defense and the Principle of the 
Non-Use of Force to Settle Territorial Disputes 
 
When considering a State whose territory is attacked and occupied by a 
neighboring State, a multitude of scenarios and outcomes can be envisaged. 
First, it may be that the victim State does not engage in any forcible re-
sponse pursuant to Article 51—whether alone or with the backing of one or 
more third States acting in collective self-defense. One such scenario would 
be a “bloodless invasion;” that is one not met by any form of armed re-
sistance (such as the Russian intervention in Crimea). It may well be that in 
this scenario, the victim State will need time to make military preparations, 
or seek third-State support, or will first attempt to achieve a negotiated so-
lution to the conflict. These efforts may well justify a delay in the forcible 
response of, for instance, several weeks or even months; a delay consistent 
with the flexible and pragmatic understanding of the immediacy require-
ment.204 Ultimately, however, if the victim State fails to trigger its right of 
self-defense within a reasonable period of time, and a new and stable terri-
torial status quo materializes, it is submitted that the victim State loses its 
right of self-defense. In sum, the victim State will find itself bound by the 
prohibition on the use of force; specifically, the prohibition on the use of 
force to settle territorial disputes, save if its right of self-defense were to be 
triggered anew by a subsequent armed attack. 
 











Alternatively, the victim State may effectively exercise its right of self-
defense—whether individually or collectively—to push back the invading 
forces. If the defensive riposte is successful, then there will be no more for-
eign occupation to consider. More relevant for present purposes, of course, 
is the opposite outcome in which the initial action in self-defense does not 
succeed in repelling the foreign troops, and a situation of prolonged occu-
pation ensues. Several further sub-scenarios can again be distinguished. 
First, it may be that there is a de facto cessation of hostilities without any 
agreement being concluded between the occupying State and the occupied 
State. In such a setting, the above considerations would apply mutatis mutan-
dis. Specifically, the victim State may choose to temporarily halt hostilities, 
perhaps to regroup its forces or to engage in diplomatic negotiations. A tem-
porary lull in the fighting does not automatically end the right of self-defense 
(and the necessity to act in self-defense). However, if the de facto cessation 
of hostilities continues over a prolonged period, the use of force will be pro-
hibited. 
Second, the cessation of hostilities may result from, or be confirmed by, 
an international agreement between the two States. The agreement may be a 
full-fledged peace agreement, putting a conclusive end to the armed conflict 
and potentially redrawing the States’ boundaries. Or, more relevant for our 
purposes, it may be a temporary ceasefire with a specific duration, whether 
several days, weeks or potentially even months. Lastly, an agreement may 
provide for an indefinite suspension of hostilities—whether formally labeled 
a ceasefire or an armistice.  
If the parties conclude a short-term (general) ceasefire, and the term 
lapses without negotiations being successful, then the occupied State can ar-
guably resume action in self-defense. However, if it fails to do so, we are 
back in the previous scenario; namely, the situation of a de facto cessation 
of hostilities, meaning the continuation of the territorial status quo gradually 
extinguishes the right of self-defense. 
If the agreement is indefinite in duration, it is, of course, important, as 
always, to consider the specific terms and conditions of the agreement. Does 
the agreement assert the application of the prohibition on the use of force 
and the obligation to pursue a peacefully negotiated solution? Is it termed an 
armistice rather than a ceasefire (with the former term normally indicating a 
stronger intention to exclude any resumption of hostilities)? Does it contain 











would allow the aggrieved party to terminate it?205 Aside from the foregoing 
considerations, it is again argued that if the ceasefire has a prolonged dura-
tion and the territorial status quo acquires a degree of stability, then the oc-
cupied State’s right of self-defense is gradually extinguished, only to be rean-
imated upon the occurrence of a new casus foederis. In other words, as time 
passes, the occupied State will no longer be in a position to invoke the rule 
enshrined in Article 36 of the Hague Regulations, according to which “the 
belligerent parties may resume operations at any time, provided always that 
the enemy is warned within the time agreed upon, in accordance with the 
terms of the armistice.”206  
The reason for this, as Greenwood rightly points out, is that the contem-
porary jus contra bellum has overtaken the Hague rule.207 By way of illustration, 
in 1951, the UN Security Council found Egypt’s continued exercise of bel-
ligerent rights against shipping to be incompatible with the 1949 Egypt-Is-
raeli Armistice Agreement.208 According to the Council, “since the armistice, 
which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent 
character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent 
or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate 
purpose of self-defence.”209 
It is stressed in this context that the situation in case of a ceasefire or 
armistice agreement of indefinite duration cannot fundamentally depart 
from that which would exist if no agreement is concluded and there is a mere 
de facto cessation of hostilities. Indeed, since the prohibition on the use of 
force is of a customary nature and part of jus cogens,210 States cannot contrac-
tually sign out of it by concluding a ceasefire or armistice agreement. In other 
words, such an agreement may well prohibit action that would otherwise be 
permitted under Article 51 UN Charter (by putting an end to action lawfully 
undertaken in self-defense). Conversely, it cannot, however, be used to pre-
serve the victim State’s right of self-defense in the long run (beyond what 
 
205. On the application of the concept of “material breach” to ceasefire agreements, 
see, e.g., DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 63. 
206. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 36, annexed 
to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. 
207. Greenwood, supra note 199, at 68.  
208. General Armistice Agreement, Egypt-Isr., Feb. 24, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 252. 
209. S.C. Res. 95 (Sept. 1, 1951). 
210. See, e.g., CORTEN, supra note 64, ch. 4.1(A). But see James A. Green, Questioning the 
Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force, 32 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-











the Charter permits). For the same reason, if the occupying State peacefully 
administers the occupied territory for a prolonged period, concluding a 
ceasefire agreement for a specific yet very long duration (e.g., a period of two 
years), or concluding multiple successive ceasefire agreements of a shorter 
duration, will not assist the occupied State in preserving the right of self-
defense over time. 
For all of the foregoing scenarios, it is impossible to apply a quantitative 
test; that is, to pinpoint an exact duration at which self-defense ceases to 
apply and the principle of the non-use of force again makes its entry. The 
analysis is inevitably contextual and is influenced by a variety of factors, in-
cluding the extent to which hostilities—even localized hostilities—continue 
to take place, the peaceful nature of the occupying power’s control over the 
occupied area, the presence of peacekeepers, or the extent to which military 
maneuvers continue to take place along the line of demarcation. The result 
is that some degree of uncertainty is unavoidable in applying the above 
framework to specific disputes. Some authors criticize this uncertainty and 
see it as a (further) reason to argue that self-defense does not expire in situ-
ations of prolonged occupation. Thus, Akande and Tzanakopoulos question 
the idea that self-defense “ceases at some (unclear) point in time when a 
status quo is established,” without “[telling] us where that point in time is.”211 
The present authors would, in turn, respond with a twofold observation. 
First, the observed uncertainty is not unique to the jus ad bellum and the ex-
ercise of self-defense. Rather, it mirrors the parallel uncertainty that exists 
with respect to the law of armed conflict, particularly in regard to the end of 
its application. Obviously, when an international armed conflict erupts, the 
law of armed conflict does not in principle cease to apply merely because of 
a specific lapse of time (save for the partial exception of the one-year limit 
found in Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).212  
 
211. Akande & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 28. 
212. Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention indeed stipulates that, in case of oc-
cupied territory, the application of the Convention “shall cease one year after the general 
close of military operations.” Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Article 6 does enu-
merate various provisions that remain applicable after this one-year period. Further, Article 
3(b) of the first Additional Protocol sets aside the one-year “time limit” enshrined in Article 
6, at least for those States that are parties to it. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 












The general rule is that “the determination that an international armed 
conflict has ended is based not on the existence of a peace agreement, but 
rather on an appreciation of the facts on the ground.”213 As the ICRC Com-
mentary to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions explains, “[h]ostil-
ities must end with a degree of stability and permanence for the [international 
armed conflict] to be considered terminated.”214 And further: “[t]he general 
close of military operations would include not only the end of active hostili-
ties but also the end of military movements of a bellicose nature, including 
those that reform, reorganize or reconstitute, so that the likelihood of the 
resumption of hostilities can reasonably be discarded.”215 The Commentary 
further acknowledges that ceasefire agreements or related instruments—ir-
respective of their exact labeling—leading to or coinciding with a de facto 
general close of military operations may indicate the point at which the 
armed conflict will be considered to have ended.216  
The point here is not to argue that the factual test used to identify the 
end of an international armed conflict and the expiry of the occupied State’s 
right of self-defense are (or ought to be) identical. Rather, the former test, 
which looks at the “general close of military operations,” would seem to be 
stricter than the latter. Thus, the ICRC Commentary suggestion that “mobiliz-
ing or deploying troops for defensive or offensive purposes should be re-
garded as military measures with a view to combat” may rule out a “general 
 
the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory of Parties 
to the conflict, on the general close of military operations and, in the case of occupied 
territories, on the termination of the occupation, except, in either circumstance, for those 
persons whose final release, repatriation or re-establishment takes place thereafter. These 
persons shall continue to benefit from the relevant provisions of the Conventions and of 
this Protocol until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment. 
  
For further reference, see JULIA GRIGNON, L’APPLICABILITÉ TEMPORELLE DU DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE [THE TEMPORAL APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 
308–24 (2014). 
213. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD 
GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 
OF WAR ¶ 309 (2020) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION]. 
See also GRIGNON, supra note 212, at 208. For a rare argument to the contrary, see DINSTEIN, 
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 35, at 51. According to Dinstein, there 
must be “some supplementary evidence (other than the fact that the front line is dormant)” 
to demonstrate the intention of the parties to terminate the armed conflict, such as the 
resumption of diplomatic relations.  
214. COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 213, ¶ 310. 
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close of military operations.”217 Surely, the factors used to factually establish 
a cessation of active hostilities for IHL purposes218 are similar to those that 
are relevant for ad bellum purposes. In turn, the mere fact that the two pro-
tagonists keep their troops mobilized on their respective sides of the line of 
demarcation does not, in our view, prevent the gradual extinction of the oc-
cupied State’s right of self-defense if the cessation of active hostilities per-
sists. In the end, our excursion into IHL is meant to illustrate the point that, 
in the words of Schachter, “[t]he difficulty of defining a precise time limit . . 
. does not impugn the basic idea”219 that the occupied State’s right of self-
defense extinguishes, any more than it would impugn the basic idea that in-
ternational armed conflicts can terminate even in the absence of a formal 
peace agreement. 
The critical observer might further object that the analogy is irrelevant 
for situations of occupation since the mere cessation of hostilities does not 
 
217. Id. ¶ 312. 
218. See, e.g., Marco Sassòli, Release, Accommodation in Neutral Countries, and Repatriation of 
Prisoners of War, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1039, 1046–47 (An-
drew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015). 
 
The concept of ‘active hostilities’ is more restrictive than that of ‘military operations’, 
because the former necessarily consist of acts of violence while the latter need not. . . . 
Ongoing troop movements do not preclude there being an end to active hostilities. . . . On 
the one hand, mere absence of fighting is certainly not sufficient. On the other hand, it is 
too much to require that the conditions must ‘render it out of the question for the defeated 
party to resume hostilities’, since this would not be the case even when a peace treaty has 
been concluded. There must be a reasonable expectation that hostilities will not resume. 
The complete defeat and occupation of one party satisfies this condition. In other cases, 
the determination of whether a risk of resumption exists must take agreements (such as a 
ceasefire which is unlimited in duration) into account. If agreements actually end hostilities, 
the repatriation process must start, even if sporadic ceasefire violations and military casual-
ties continue to occur. If an armistice is monitored by peacekeeping forces, this is generally 
a good indication of a lasting cessation of hostilities. The same applies to a United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution calling for an end of hostilities if it is respected on the 
ground, as well as to unilateral declarations by both belligerents that they will stop the 
fighting. In the absence of an agreement or unilateral declarations, it is reasonable to wait 
for a certain period to determine whether active hostilities have actually ended. A determi-
nation then equally depends on what parties are saying. In the reverse situation, when there 
is continuing fighting on the ground (despite an agreement or unilateral declarations), it is 
decisive whether this fighting corresponds with the will of the parties. A declaration by a 
party that it will not resume hostilities, responding to a similar declaration by the adverse 
party, must be presumed to be genuine, except where the facts on the ground clearly con-
tradict it, or where the declaring authority has lost control over the state it represented. 
Indeed, a party that resumes hostilities it has declared to have ended will inevitably meet the 
opprobrium of the UN and third states. 
 











change the fact that, as long as the occupation continues, the law of armed 
conflict (particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention) continues to apply. 
Yet, it is worth recalling that, here too, the active cessation of hostilities in 
principle triggers the obligation under Article 118 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention to release and repatriate prisoners of war “without delay.”220 In other 
words, prolonged occupation does not absolve the occupied State (or the 
occupying State, of course) from repatriating prisoners of war. In this con-
text too, 
 
[i]t is impossible to state in the abstract how much time needs to pass with-
out armed confrontations taking place to conclude with an acceptable de-
gree of certainty that active hostilities have ended in a sustainable way. Such 
an assessment always needs to take into account all the factual circum-
stances in a given case, including past patterns of surging and declining 
violence in the armed conflict in question.221 
 
Leaving aside the analogy with IHL, the critique relating to the difficulty 
in ascertaining when the status quo extinguishes the occupied State’s right of 
self-defense calls for a second observation. Recall that the alternative sce-
nario put forward by some critics is that the right of self-defense of the oc-
cupied State is temporarily suspended when the two sides engage in peaceful 
negotiations for a prolonged period of time and/or conclude an indefinite 
ceasefire but revives when peaceful efforts are deemed to be exhausted—
supposedly because this entails a renewed necessity to act in self-defense.222 
If anything, however, the uncertainty is all the greater in this alternative sce-
nario. Indeed, while there are certain objective parameters (comparable to 
those used for IHL purposes) that allow us to identify a continued cessation 
of active hostilities, the question of examining the exhaustion of peaceful 
negotiations in situations of unlawful occupation lends itself far less to ob-
jective assessment. To take just one example, could one say, forty-seven 
years after the invasion of Turkish forces in Northern Cyprus and the de 
facto partition of the island, that the peaceful route has hit a dead end? Or 
 
220. COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 213, ¶ 4454 
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does the intermittent organization of (mostly UN-led) peace talks point in 
the other direction? As one observer astutely points out, 
  
frozen conflicts can last for decades, with bursts of negotiations, some-
times with glimmers of hope that they might produce something . . ., but 
most often with much disappointment. How exactly can could one reliably 
say, aha, at this point the peaceful options were exhausted and self-defence 
became necessary? Couldn’t one always object that the lawful sovereign 
should wait a bit more, hoping say for a change of government in their 
adversary? Couldn’t one conversely always say that the lawful sovereign has 
waited long enough?223 
 
With regard to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, one 
could point to the numerous bilateral and multilateral meetings in the years 
preceding the 2020 war to suggest that negotiations were still ongoing and 
could and should have been continued.224 Yet, one might just as well argue 
that any refusal by the occupying State (e.g., expressed in diplomatic state-
ments or during a political summit) to return the occupied territory in its 
entirety and without delay to the rightful owner can automatically be taken 
to reflect a failure of peaceful negotiations. In sum, “the imponderability of 
[this] assessment is a good reason to favour the other option, protective of 
the status quo.”225 
 
D. In the Margin: Legal Consequences of an Attempted Recovery of Occupied Ter-
ritory Through Armed Force 
 
To complete the above analysis, it is worth pausing a moment to reflect on 
the legal consequences of the approach developed above. Those who see 
armed action to recover unlawfully occupied territory as a lawful exercise of 
the right of self-defense take the view that the occupying State cannot invoke 
the right of self-defense to resist such effort (as “there can be no self-defence 
against self-defence”226). If the occupied State succeeds in its attempt, it will 
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be permitted to retain the recovered territory over which it holds a valid title 
and to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest.  
But what of the contrary position, to which the present authors sub-
scribe? Critics of this position might point at the absurdity that a State that 
succeeds in recovering long-lost territory through the use of armed force 
would be legally compelled to again hand it over to the former occupier. But 
is this truly so? Put differently: is Azerbaijan required under the law of inter-
national responsibility to return to Armenia those parts of Nagorno-
Karabakh which it recovered during the hostilities in 2020?  
The purpose of the present interlude is not to dive into the intricacies of 
determining the proper reparation for breaches of the jus ad bellum or the 
complex questions of causality that arise in such setting—and which are am-
ply reflected in the (controversial) approach to jus ad bellum liability by the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission.227 Suffice it to note that the present 
authors do not believe that the wrongful nature of the occupied State’s for-
cible recovery of lost territory necessarily entails that the territory should be 
handed back to the former occupier. 
Indeed, we are presented here with a scenario that features two wrongs 
that exist in parallel, namely the continuing breach of Article 2(4) resulting 
from the initial occupation, on the one hand, and the breach of Article 2(4) 
resulting from the occupied State’s attempt to recover land that had been 
peacefully administered by the occupying State, on the other hand. Such con-
currence of parallel wrongs is not unique to the present context. One can 
easily think of various other illustrations, whether or not connected to the 
jus ad bellum. One example would be where State A uses armed force to re-
cover an area that is the object of a territorial dispute with pre-Charter origins 
with State B after B has refused to implement an arbitral ruling finding that 
valid title over the area rests with State A. Or imagine the (admittedly com-
pletely unrealistic) scenario that, frustrated with the UK’s reluctance to give 
effect to the ICJ’s advisory opinion finding an obligation, on the part of the 
United Kingdom to end its administration of the Chagos archipelago,228 
Mauritius would take matters in its own hands.  
It is a cliché to say that two wrongs do not make a right. Yet, this does 
not mean the concurrence of two wrongs is without consequence from the 
perspective of the law of State responsibility. Rather, the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility expressly embrace the idea of 
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so-called “contributory fault.” More specifically, Article 39 of the Articles on 
State Responsibility acknowledges that “[i]n the determination of reparation, 
account shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent 
action or omission of the injured State.”229 The commentary further clarifies 
that the relevance of contributory fault is not limited to the context of com-
pensation but “may also be relevant to other forms of reparation,”230 includ-
ing restitution. The basic message here is that determining that the recovery 
of occupied territory was achieved through unlawful use of force does not 
automatically mean that the State must return land over which it held a valid 
title. One can indeed imagine other solutions under the law of State respon-
sibility, chiefly involving the payment of compensation to repair the damage 
directly caused by the unlawful recourse to force. The work of the Ethiopia-
Eritrea Claims Commission and the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission 
effectively confirm that it is possible to order a State to pay compensation 
for an unlawful use of force against neighboring territory, while nonetheless 
confirming that the aggressor State holds a valid title over part of the land it 
obtained (or regained) through the use of armed force. 
 
V. STATE PRACTICE 
 
While the approach sketched above is based on conceptual-legal arguments, 
the question remains whether it is at all reflective of State practice. A number 
of precedents merit closer scrutiny in this context. 
First, reference can be made to two occasions where States used force to 
recover territories claimed to be theirs, but which had come to be occupied 
by a third State long before the 1945 UN Charter saw the light of day:231 the 
Indian intervention in Goa in 1961 and the Falkland/Malvinas War in 1982. 
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231. A third example could in theory be added. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, it 
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On December 18, 1961, India dispatched its military forces to the terri-
tory of Goa,232 a Portuguese overseas enclave conquered by Alfonso de Al-
buquerque in 1510. After armed confrontations that lasted no longer than a 
day, mostly due to the sizable disparity of military personnel engaged in ac-
tive hostilities on both sides, India comfortably seized control and annexed 
the territory, as the outnumbered Portuguese troops swiftly withdrew.233 
Upon the request of Portugal, which accused India of an unprovoked 
act of aggression against its territory, 234 the Security Council held two urgent 
meetings on the conflict. India denied outright having acted in contravention 
to the UN Charter, justifying its military incursion on the basis that Portugal 
had illegally occupied Goa for 450 years. In particular, India claimed that 
“there can be no question of aggression against your own frontier”235 and 
labeled the dispute a colonial question.236  
Neither of the two draft resolutions that were put to the vote was 
adopted by the Council, as the views expressed during the debates were far 
apart from each other.237 Nevertheless, the majority position held by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, China, Chile, and Ec-
uador238 denounced India’s conduct as an unlawful use of force against Por-
tugal. They rejected the notion that the crux of the dispute was colonialism, 
holding instead that the relevant matter at hand was the prohibition of the 
 
Iraq . . . [had] no legal validity, and is considered null and void.” S.C. Res. 662, ¶ 1 (Aug. 9, 
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233. Tom Ruys, The Indian Intervention in Goa — 1961, in THE USE OF FORCE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 99, at 85, 85; Yiallourides & 
Yihdego, supra note 100, at 51; YIALLOURIDES ET AL., supra note 96, at 66. 
234. Permanent Rep. of Portugal to the U.N., Letter dated Dec. 18, 1961 from the 
Permanent Rep. of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/5030 (Dec. 18, 1961). 
235. U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 987th mtg. ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. S/PV 987 (Dec. 18, 1961) 
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV 987] (“The fact that [Portugal] has occupied [Goa] for 450 
years is of no consequence, because, during nearly 425 or 430 years of that period we really 
had no chance to do anything because we were under colonial domination ourselves. But 
during the last fourteen years, from the very day when we became independent, we have 
not ceased to demand the return of the peoples under illegal domination to their own coun-
trymen . . . .”). 
236. Id. ¶ 40.  
237. Ruys, The Indian Intervention in Goa, supra note 233, at 86. Both resolutions were 
vetoed by permanents members of the Security Council. 
238. U.N. Doc. S/PV 987, supra note 235, ¶¶ 72–76 (United States), 101 (Turkey), 87 
(United Kingdom), 99 (Turkey); U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 988th mtg. ¶¶ 9 (France), 10 (Ec-











use of force to settle territorial disputes. 239 The predominant position at the 
Security Council can be partially explained by the fact that, while India made 
haphazard and ambiguous references to the right of self-defense during the 
debates, it failed to provide any substantial evidence that a recent armed at-
tack had taken place240 or that Portugal had provoked their military interven-
tion in the region. Thus, most States sitting on the Council at the time con-
sidered that India, regardless of the validity of its territorial claim, had 
breached Article 2(4) by attempting to alter the existing status quo241 and 
settle a territorial dispute by forceful means.242 It follows that none of these 
States believed that India had retained a right of self-defense ever since the 
Portuguese conquest of Goa in 1510. 
Likewise, the idea that Portugal’s prolonged occupation of Goa 
amounted to a continuing armed attack was not directly argued by India and 
it can only be implied from the arguments presented at the Security Coun-
cil.243 Furthermore, India’s attempt to circumscribe its conduct in the 
broader context of decolonization and its failure to provide a cogent justifi-
cation of its actions under the jus ad bellum certainly hints at its lack of con-
viction regarding the legality of its acts under that legal framework. The four 
States that sided with India at the Security Council focused on the relevance 
of the “Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries 
and peoples”244 and Portugal’s failure to abide by its obligations as an admin-
istering power under Chapter XI of the UN Charter, instead of providing an 
elaborate explanation of the incident under the jus ad bellum.245 
While the Goa precedent represents the first time in which the Security 
Council failed to condemn the annexation of territory by the use of force,246 
this is largely explained by the deep political division which reigned at the 
time between the West and socialist States, a separation often emphasized in 
the context of decolonization. On closer scrutiny, however, the Goa prece-
dent did not end up altering the basic idea that States must not use force to 
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settle territorial disputes, as demonstrated by the next relevant precedent, the 
Falkland/Malvinas War. 
On April 2, 1982, Argentina’s military junta sent around 1,400 troops to 
occupy the Falkland Islands,247 also known as the Malvinas, an archipelago 
located in the South Atlantic Ocean some 500 kilometers off the Argentine 
coast. Argentina had taken possession of the archipelago under the uti possi-
detis juris principle after gaining independence from Spain. It was forced out 
by British forces in 1833; thus, the islands had been occupied and adminis-
tered by the United Kingdom for over 150 years at the time of the invasion. 
Historically, Argentina had consistently rejected the British territorial title 
over the islands, regarding them as illegally occupied.248 The military invasion 
was presented as an act of legitimate defense249 against the continuous act of 
aggression perpetrated by the United Kingdom since the forceful seizure of 
the islands in 1833.250 In other words, Argentina claimed to be acting in self-
defense in response to a continuous armed attack, despite the prolonged 
peaceful administration exercised by the United Kingdom over the islands. 
The British government reacted by deploying a naval task force in the 
exercise of its right of self-defense and calling an urgent meeting of the Se-
curity Council.251 A large majority of the Security Council members, and the 
delegations that were allowed to take part in the meeting, condemned the 
Argentinian invasion, qualifying it as an armed attack against the United 
Kingdom, hence, a breach of the prohibition of the use of force.252 As a 
result, Resolution 502 was passed on April 3, 1982, acknowledging the exist-
ence of a breach of the peace caused by the invasion of the armed forces of 
Argentina, demanding both States immediately cease all hostilities, and call-
ing for the immediate withdrawal of Argentina’s troops from the islands.253 
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The voting records reflect the overwhelming support of the British posi-
tion,254 with the text of the resolution reproduced almost exactly from the 
draft presented by the United Kingdom.255 
The British forces managed to overcome and expel the Argentinian 
troops from the islands after ten weeks of hostilities. Both parties agreed to 
a de facto ceasefire in June 1982.256 Outside the institutional veil of the Se-
curity Council, the vast majority of the international community condemned 
Argentina’s invasion as a violation of the prohibition of the use of force and 
the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means. It is particularly telling 
that many of the States that supported or recognized the validity of Argen-
tina’s territorial claims over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands still denounced 
the invasion as an unlawful use of force.257 Accordingly, this precedent is 
widely regarded as a compelling confirmation of the prohibition of the use 
of force in the context of territorial disputes, as the Argentinian attempt to 
recover territory by forceful means was largely condemned.258  
It must be acknowledged that, in these cases, the origins of the supposed 
occupation (long) predated the introduction of the contemporary prohibi-
tion on the use of force. It follows that—for all its flaws—their precedential 
value may be limited in light of the principle of inter-temporality. The ques-
tion then remains whether there have been other instances where States 
sought to forcibly recover territory supposedly under foreign occupation 
originating after 1945. 
A first observation is that for all the lingering territorial disputes and sit-
uations that could be seen as involving a form of occupation, there have 
been remarkably few cases where States made use of armed force to chal-
lenge the existing territorial status quo and even fewer cases where they have 
done so by relying on a right of self-defense against a continuing armed at-
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tack. This is not insignificant since State inaction and omissions equally qual-
ify as State practice or subsequent practice for purposes of identifying cus-
tomary law259 and/or interpreting the relevant treaty rules.  
True, in the proceedings before the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commis-
sion, Eritrea justified its actions on the ground that “Ethiopia was unlawfully 
occupying Eritrean territory in the area around Badme”260 and that it was 
exercising its right of self-defense. At the same time, it is noted (i) that this 
argument was only raised during the arbitral proceedings, not at the actual 
start of the conflict (when Eritrea instead denied allegations of incursions 
and accused Ethiopia of having acted first); (ii) that it was combined with 
other arguments, namely that Ethiopia had first attacked Eritrean troops, 
and that it had been Ethiopia that had declared war on Eritrea;261 and (iii) 
that the Commission unequivocally dismissed the argument that Eritrea 
could lawfully recover territory over which it held valid title.262  
The primary example from State practice that could be seen to dispel the 
legal framework laid out in Section III—and which accordingly commands 
a closer analysis—is the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Egypt and Syria, 
reportedly supported by several other Arab States, unsuccessfully sought to 
recover the land occupied by Israel in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day 
War.263  
It is recalled that on November 22, 1967, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 242, imposing a ceasefire on the parties and setting forth a series 
of principles that ought to guide the search for a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East, including the need for Israel to withdraw “from territories oc-
cupied in the recent conflict.” 264 Notwithstanding the formal acceptance of 
the ceasefire by the various stakeholders, a so-called “war of attrition” en-
sued between Egypt and Israel, involving, inter alia, artillery shelling and am-
phibious raids, along with occasional confrontations and incursions by non-
State armed groups along the Israel-Jordan and Israel-Syria ceasefire lines. A 
new ninety-day ceasefire was agreed to by Israel and Egypt (and Jordan) in 
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August 1970.265 A three-month extension followed in September 1970, and 
in February 1971, Egypt agreed to a final extension of the ceasefire for an-
other thirty days, during which it called for a partial Israeli withdrawal along 
the east bank of the Suez Canal.266 In the absence of such withdrawal, Egypt 
in March 1971 declared that it no longer considered itself bound by the 
ceasefire.267  
Meanwhile, UN-led mediations failed to achieve a breakthrough, primar-
ily due to Israel’s refusal to commit to “withdrawal to the international 
boundary” existing before the 1967 war. The mediation attempt was ulti-
mately abandoned in 1972.268 Against this background, Egypt and Syria 
sought to take back their land by force. 
At first sight, this precedent would appear to flatly contradict the analysis 
above. Indeed, the Yom Kippur War is undeniably a case where States re-
sorted to armed force to recover land that had been occupied for several 
years. The offensive was not formally condemned by either the Security 
Council or the General Assembly. Quite the contrary, many States expressed 
their support for Egypt and Syria, while no State took the view that the Israeli 
response constituted a lawful exercise of self-defense.269 What is more, as 
hinted at above, both Egypt and Syria expressly argued in the Security Coun-
cil debates that Israel’s occupation amounted to a continuing armed attack 
justifying action in self-defense to recover the occupied land.270 Both coun-
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tries dismissed as absurd the idea that Israel could rely on the ceasefire im-
posed by the Security Council in Resolution 242 (1967) as a proverbial “li-
cence to occupy.”271 In the words of the Egyptian UN representative, 
 
Regarding the Security Council cease-fire in June 1967, it is closely linked 
with withdrawal from occupied territories. The strange theory that this or 
any cease-fire is for an unlimited time obviously means that the occupation 
is unlimited. Should we accept that the cease-fire must be observed until 
both parties—the occupier and the occupied—agree to put an end to it, 
then we would accept that the occupying Power can be evacuated only by 
its own consent. 272 
 
Additionally, numerous countries, particularly from the Soviet bloc and 
group of non-aligned countries,273 expressly supported the action undertaken 
by Syria and Egypt to liberate their occupied territory, at times explicitly 
couching their arguments in terms of the right to self-defense, which, ac-
cording to India, could “never be . . . extinguished.”274 Thus, Syria and 
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Egypt’s military efforts were approved by the Soviet Union,275 China,276 In-
dia,277 Indonesia,278 Yugoslavia,279 and others.280 
There is, however, more to this than meets the eye. Indeed, leaving aside 
the highly questionable argument that Israel’s occupation of neighboring ter-
ritory resulted from a lawful exercise of self-defense and was therefore not 
unlawful,281 it is remarkable that, at the outset of the Yom Kippur War, both 
Egypt and Syria informed the Security Council that they were acting in self-
defense in reaction to an Israeli offensive along the “cease-fire line.”282 While 
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the claim that Israel had itself triggered the conflict turned out to be 
false283—UN observers reported a “sudden surprise attack” by the Egyptian 
and Syrian armies284—it remains striking that Egypt and Syria felt the need 
to shift the responsibility for the first use of force to Israel. This approach 
sits uneasily with the notion that the Israeli occupation was in and of itself 
sufficient to justify action in self-defense and signals that the two Arab coun-
tries were not themselves convinced of the strength of that argument and/or 
of third States’ receptiveness to this argument.285 It is not excluded, moreo-
ver, that this impacted the appraisal of the conflict by third States.286  
Further, several States refrained from apportioning blame but instead 
focused on the need for a peaceful solution to the conflict and an end to 
hostilities to end the human suffering.287 
Finally, one cannot overlook the many skirmishes and other incidents 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the wake of the Six-Day War. This 
was particularly the case throughout the 1967 to 1970 war of attrition be-
tween Israel and Egypt.288 Yet, even after the conclusion of a new short-term 
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ceasefire in the summer of 1970, incidents continued to occur along the 
ceasefire lines.289 A May 1973 UN report cited seventeen major incidents 
disrupting the ceasefire between July 1967 and April 1973 that were dis-
cussed in the UN Security Council (while several other incidents were simply 
not brought before the Security Council).290 Only four weeks before the out-
break of the Yom Kippur War, Israeli and Syrian jets clashed over the Med-
iterranean in their biggest air battle since the 1967 war.291 Egypt also repeat-
edly threatened war in 1972 and 1973. Against this background, François 
Dubuisson and Vaios Koutroulis find that “it can hardly be suggested that 
the occupied Arab territories were under the peaceful administration of Is-
rael.”292 In light thereof, the two authors also argue that the Yom Kippur 
War neither contradicts nor supports the analysis put forth by the Ethiopia-
Eritrea Claims Commission in its Partial Award on the Jus ad Bellum.293 
Of course, our overview of relevant practice would not be complete 
without a closer look at the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war itself. While the 
background and facts have been treated earlier, a few points are worth ob-
serving. First, statements by at least two countries—both allies of Azerbai-
jan—appeared to support the idea that Azerbaijan could invoke the right of 
self-defense to recover territory occupied by Armenia. One was a statement 
by the Pakistani ambassador to Azerbaijan.294 The other was a letter to the 
Security Council in which Turkey asserted that Azerbaijan was “exercising 
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its inherent right of self-defense, since the hostilities are taking place exclu-
sively on its own sovereign territory.”295 Azerbaijan itself, however, seem-
ingly refrained from developing this argument.296 Instead, similar to the ap-
proach of Egypt and Syria during the Yom Kippur War, Azerbaijan accused 
Armenia of having “launched another aggression against Azerbaijan, by in-
tensively shelling the positions of [its] armed forces” on September 27, 
2020.297 Azerbaijan’s action then was, in its own words, no more than a 
“counter-offensive . . . within the right of self-defence.”298 
Further, the conflict was not addressed by the UN Security Council, and 
States generally refrained from taking a stance on the legality of the protag-
onists’ conduct under the jus ad bellum—a silence partly due to the uncertainty 
as to who triggered the outbreak of hostilities. Numerous countries did call 
for an immediate end to all hostilities and stressed that the conflict could be 
solved only through peaceful negotiations.299 In a joint statement, the presi-
dents of Russia, the United States, and France “[condemned] in the strongest 
terms the recent escalation of violence along the Line of Contact in the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict zone” (without pointing the blame at one party or 
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the other).300 In the end, these reactions hardly evidence support for the po-
sition that an occupied State is at liberty to challenge the territorial status quo 
and pursue the recovery of its land through military means. In summary, we 
do not believe that the latest confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
lends support to the concept of an unlawful occupation as a continuing 
armed attack. 
 
VI. EPILOGUE: PEACE AGAINST JUSTICE? 
 
In the present article, we sought to examine to what extent international law 
permits resort to armed force to recover territory occupied by another State. 
We saw how some authors view occupation as a “continuous” armed attack. 
According to this view, the occupied State’s right of self-defense is not ex-
tinguished by the emergence of a new territorial status quo, even if the oc-
cupying State peacefully administers the territory concerned for a prolonged 
period (whether multiple years or even decades). Instead, this right is at most 
temporarily suspended when the protagonists conclude a ceasefire or other-
wise engage in peaceful negotiations.  
The counterargument emphasizes that any exercise of self-defense is 
subject to a requirement of “immediacy” and that a victim State ultimately 
forfeits its right of self-defense if it fails to act within a reasonable time and 
after a new status quo has materialized. This position finds support in the 
principle of the non-use of force to settle territorial disputes and that at-
tempts to carve out an exception from this principle for (certain) situations 
of unlawful occupation are problematic and unconvincing. 
Subsequently, we examined how, in State practice, there is little evidence 
to support the view that the occupied State preserves its right of self-defense 
in perpetuity, albeit the 1973 Yom Kippur War serves as an important coun-
ter-example. 
In the end, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the dilemma before 
us is one on which legal scholars remain deeply divided and one lacking an 
authoritative answer (at least if we discount the oft-criticized Jus ad Bellum 
award of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission301). It also leaves little or 
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no room for compromise, i.e., some form of middle ground between the two 
juxtaposed views.  
Inevitably, we cannot ignore the closely entwined teleological and utili-
tarian dimensions of the debate, which largely explain this deep divide. In-
deed, the debate raises challenging questions about the fundamental pur-
poses of the Charter framework on the use of force, and the relative priority 
to accord to those objectives when they collide, as well as the desired out-
comes, having regard to the manifold territorial disputes potentially affected. 
One of the Charter objectives that is pivotal in this context concerns the 
protection of States’ territorial integrity, which is expressly mentioned in Ar-
ticle 2(4), and, on a related note, the “suppression of aggression” (Article 
1(1). Indeed, this purpose is defeated when we allow aggressor States to “get 
away” with invasion and occupation by providing only a limited timeframe 
within which the “victim State” must act before forfeiting its right of self-
defense. It has been argued that the latter position tends to “reward” the 
aggressor and may even “encourage” aggression. Such surrender to the “re-
alist” position that the strong do as they can and the weak suffer as they must 
has been regarded as contravening the principle of ex iniuria jus non oritur,302 
according to which legal rights cannot arise from unlawful acts. 
The present authors fully acknowledge that an occupied State may feel 
unfairly disadvantaged if it has limited time to react militarily to occupation. 
To suggest that this “incites” aggression may be a bridge too far. A State that 
is planning to launch an offensive and send its troops into neighboring ter-
ritory will be guided by a variety of factors, including the political support at 
home, the military strength and likely response of the target State, and the 
expected response from the international community (e.g., in the form of 
sanctions, collective self-defense or UN enforcement action). The possibility 
that the victim State might still be legally entitled to exercise self-defense at 
some point in the future after a new territorial status quo has materialized is 
not likely to figure (high) on this list. Yet, the frustration that the aggressor 
is “rewarded” since the law favors the consolidation of the unlawful territo-
rial status quo is understandable and legitimate. 
Still, this frustration must be put into perspective. First, from a strictly 
legal perspective, it seems difficult to maintain that a prohibition to resort to 
force to recover (long-)occupied territory breaches the principle of ex iniuria 
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jus non oritur. Indeed, whatever the latter principle’s normative status and 
scope,303 the mere fact that States cannot resort to armed force to undo in-
ternationally wrongful conduct of which they have been the victim should 
not be taken to imply that the wrongdoing State obtains an actual right, a 
legal entitlement, from its wrongful behavior. In the present case, the core 
of the ex iniuria principle is indeed protected in that the peaceful administra-
tion of occupied territory does not give birth to a legal entitlement to the 
territory concerned, as the Friendly Relations Declaration, for example, re-
affirms. 
Second, against the perception that the law surrenders to the maxim that 
“might makes right” and leaves the occupied State without a remedy, the 
international legal framework does provide important tools to deter aggres-
sion and support the cause of the victim State. Thus, while a smaller State 
may well be powerless on its own in the face of a territorial invasion by a 
stronger neighbor, Article 51 confirms the victim’s right to request support 
from third States in countering the aggression (pursuant to the right of col-
lective self-defense). In addition, the Security Council may take enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, whether by authorizing military 
enforcement action (as it did following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait) and/or by 
imposing economic sanctions. Unilateral sanctions may also be imposed by 
individual States or regional organizations such as the European Union,304 
and the victim State itself is, of course, entitled to take countermeasures.305 
Whether support from the Security Council and/or from third States is 
forthcoming will ultimately and inevitably depend on a range of essentially 
political considerations, yet what matters is that the UN Charter facilitates 
such support. Furthermore, third States are bound by the duty of non-recog-
nition of conquest, an important corollary of the prohibition on the use of 
force that finds confirmation in Article 41(2) of the International Law Com-
mission Articles on State Responsibility306 (albeit that doctrine has recently 
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come under attack from the very State responsible for its creation307). To this 
may be added the criminalization of aggression and the recent activation of 
the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion308—a jurisdiction yet to be put to the test. 
Third, and more fundamentally, it is stressed that the protection of 
States’ territorial integrity is but one of the various objectives of the UN 
Charter. To this must be added other competing objectives, such as the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the peaceful resolution 
of disputes between States. It has rightly been observed that notwithstanding 
the many debates on the scope of the right of self-defense and the legality of 
“humanitarian intervention,” the outlawry of war is “the biggest single 
change in the international order” of the twentieth century and deserves 
some credit for the marked decline in inter-State armed conflict since 
1945.309 A significant number of territorial disputes have been submitted to 
judicial dispute settlement over the past decades.310 Many others remain at 
present unresolved. One of many such examples is the de facto separation 
of the island of Cyprus into two parts, one of which—the self-proclaimed 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—has been under Turkish occupation 
since 1974.311 Cyprus serves as a striking illustration of the dilemma before 
us. One could argue that since forty-seven years have passed after the Turk-
ish invasion and many thousands of Turkish troops remain on the island, the 
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peaceful route has hit a dead end. But are we willing to accept that the mili-
tary option is, therefore, again on the table? In considering Cyprus and the 
many other existing frozen conflicts, it is submitted that the goal of achieving 
international stability is better served by adopting a broad reading of the 
principle of the non-use of force (to settle territorial disputes), rather than 
by granting occupied States an open-ended right to self-defense with no time 
constraint. This is all the more so, of course, if it is accepted that this right 
can be exercised collectively—in other words, if a country can seek military 
support from others to recover occupied land. The risk of third-State in-
volvement and spill-over effects, or even of the transformation of a conflict 
into a regional war, should not lightly be dismissed (as the far-reaching sup-
port of Turkey to Azerbaijan in the course of the 2020 conflict over Na-
gorno-Karabakh well illustrates312). 
While emphasizing the purpose of the United Nations is “to maintain 
international peace and security” and “save future generations from the 
scourge of war,” the Charter’s preamble also stresses the fundamental hu-
man rights of individual human beings—including, first and foremost, the 
right to life. Since the Charter’s adoption in 1945, the international legal or-
der has undergone a marked trend towards “humanization”—in the words 
of Theodor Meron313—with individuals’ well-being and fundamental rights 
overtaking abstract State interests as its center of gravity. This trend is illus-
trated by the recently adopted General Comment No. 36 of the Human 
Rights Committee on the right to life, seen as the “supreme right,”314 in 
which the Human Rights Committee draws a link between the right to life 
and the jus ad bellum.  
Thus, the Human Rights Committee posits that “States parties engaged 
in acts of aggression as defined in international law, resulting in deprivation 
of life, violate ipso facto article 6 of the [International] Covenant [on Civil 
and Political Rights].”315 And further, “States parties that fail to take all rea-
sonable measures to settle their disputes by peaceful means might fall short 
of complying with their positive obligation to ensure the right to life.”316 In 
other words, apart from the conceptual arguments laid out in detail in the 
previous Section, one must also be cognizant of the human cost at stake. 
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Indeed, while situations of occupation often go hand-in-hand with individual 
human rights violations and a prolonged occupation may itself contravene 
the right of self-determination, inter-State armed hostilities inevitably result 
in (often widespread) loss of life, material destruction, and internal displace-
ment. The forty-four-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 
claimed the lives of 5,000 soldiers and at least 140 civilians.317 Many of the 
Armenian and Azeri soldiers killed on the battlefield were not even born 
when Armenia gained control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 1993–
94. According to UNICEF, more than 130,000 civilians were displaced by 
the fighting.318 Hundreds of homes and vital infrastructure such as schools 
and hospitals were destroyed, with unexploded ordnance posing a continu-
ing threat to life and limb in populated areas.319 And while Azerbaijan recov-
ered part of the occupied area from Armenia, and the parties agreed to the 
deployment of Russian peacekeepers, the ceasefire agreement merely “re-
freezes” the new status quo, without bringing an end to the conflict over the 
region,320 a goal that can be achieved only through further peaceful negotia-
tions.321  
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The 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbai-
jan has spotlighted an important dilemma for international law on the use of 
force—and one that has been partly overlooked in legal doctrine: can a State 
use armed force to recover unlawfully occupied territory? The question 
seemingly finds us caught between the Scylla of injustice and the Charybdis 
of insecurity. According to the present authors, however, the protection of 
territorial integrity cannot be pursued at all costs or operate in a vacuum, 
disregarding other core values enshrined in the UN Charter, such as the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, the maintenance of peace and stability be-
tween nations, and the protection of fundamental human rights. In the end, 
in the context of occupation, the objective behind the prohibition of the use 
of force is better accomplished by protecting the territorial status quo instead 
of granting an open-ended right to self-defense with no time constraint. Or, 
as the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission rightly put it, “border disputes 
between States are so frequent that any exception to the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force for territory that is allegedly occupied unlawfully would 
create a large and dangerous hole in a fundamental rule of international 
law.”322 
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On 11, 12 and 15 December 2020, the Azerbaijani armed forces, in violation of the trilateral 
statement on the complete ceasefire and cessation of all hostilities signed by the leaders of 
Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan on 9 November 2020, launched an attack on the villages 
of Khtsaberd and Hin Tagher in the Hadrut Region of the Republic of Artsakh, taking 
advantage of the absence of Russian peacekeeping forces there. 
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I am writing to draw your attention to the continued attempts of Armenia to deploy its 
armed personnel to the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan. According to 
credible information available to the Azerbaijani side, which is also validated by the reports 
of independent mass media sources, members of the armed forces of Armenia, wearing 
civilian dress, are transferred to the territory of Azerbaijan through the “Lachin Corridor” 
in civilian trucks, including disguised among construction cargo, in an attempt to escape the 
control procedures of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. 
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